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During last decade, improved macroeconomic and budgetary condi-
tions have allowed for ﬁscal reforms in several EU countries. The main
aim behind personal income tax reforms across Europe has been to re-
duce the tax burden on labour and to encourage work - especially for
less productive workers. In this context, Anglo Saxon countries and more
recently Continental European Countries, including Belgium, have shown
increasing interest in tax-beneﬁt instruments awarding monetary trans-
fers or tax reductions, conditional on employment. Using a discrete hours
labour supply model, this paper assesses the impact of the 2001 Belgian
Tax Reform on female labour supply. Results suggest that labour supply
responses are moderate but signiﬁcant by international standards. Yet,
due to an uneven calibration of tax rebates and in-work beneﬁts, the po-
tential labour supply responses are rather dispersed over the whole range
of the income distribution. Consequently, the gains from the reform do
not appear to be evenly distributed across taxpayers.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Boosting public spending between the early 70s and the mid 80s rapidly de-
teriorated Belgium’s public ﬁnance. Eﬃcient budgetary measures taken in the
early 90s in order to meet the Maastricht criteria have recently brought primary
outlays back in line with the average EU level, yet total government outlays re-
main high, due to high debt servicing costs. At the same time the tax burden,
and especially the tax burden on labour, is amongst the highest in Europe
(Carey,2003).
Recently, cross-country empirical studies on the potential negative eﬀects of
the tax burden on employment have been surveyed by De Haan et al. (2002).
They conclude that, although the overall eﬀect of the tax wedge is probably
smaller than earlier estimates, its eﬀects are greater in continental European
countries, due to an intermediate level of labour market centralization.
Particularly harmful are the eﬀects of heavy taxation on the employment
level of low skilled workers (Layard and Nickell, 1999). High tax wedges and
high replacement rates1 are the main causes of persistent lower employment
rates in the less skilled population. Fig. 1 shows the evolution of employment
rates for low skilled, medium skilled and high skilled workers. Obviously eﬀorts
to raise the employment rate should be directed towards the less skilled, for
whom ﬁnancial gains from taking up work are signiﬁcantly lower.
The picture is even more dramatic if we break down employment rates by
sex. Fig.2 decomposes the employment rate of men, single women and married
1Replacement rates are usually deﬁned as the ratio of disposable income when unemployed
or inactive to disposable income in employment. For an analysis of replacement rates across
EU countries see Immervoll and O’Donughue (2003).
1Sex Low Medium High Total
Men 70.0% 87.0% 91.0% 82.0%
Women 39.5% 68.0% 83.3% 62.0%
- Single 41.0% 70.5% 85.4% 65.9%
- Married 38.9% 66.8% 82.1% 60.2%
Source: Author's calculations based on LFS (2001)
Education
Figure 2: Employment rates (males and females aged between 25 and 59)
women2. In particular, it is the group of married women3 that shows the lowest
employment rates (just about 60%), of whi c hm o r et h a nh a l fi sr e p r e s e n t e db y
atypical part time (5 to 15 hours of work per week) and part time.
As i g n i ﬁcant tax reform was introduced in Belgium over the period 1988-
1993 (Decoster and Al., 2002). The reform implied a shift from a joint family
taxation (which is known to be a strong disincentive to married women’s labour
supply) towards a broadly individualized system. Other aspects of the reform
were (i) the broadening of the tax base, (ii) the abolition of the highest marginal
tax rates (the highest marginal tax rate was as high as 70.8%), (iii) the collapse
from 14 tax brackets into 7, the abolition of the zero tax bracket and of several
deductible expenses and the introduction of new tax credits. Unfortunately, no
study has yet focused on the potential labour supply responses to such deep
reform.
Historically, more attention has been devoted in Belgium to demand side
measures, probably due to the high structural unemployment level. The reduc-
tion of employers’ Social Security Contributions (SSC) for low paid workers has
been promoted as early as 1988 by a group of economists known as "the group of
the seventy-two" as a means to increase low skilled employment. At that time
the proposed reduction was in the order of 22500 BEF per year, i.e. approxi-
mately 65 EUR per month in 2004 values. Using the macro-model HERMES,
Van der Linden (1991) estimated that such reform would reduce unemployment
by around 25000 units. SSC reductions have indeed characterised most of the
90s, ﬁrst following a rather scattered pattern. Since 1994, however, the re-
duction of SSC has been generalized to all low paid workers, while additional
reductions have been granted to employers hiring youngsters, long-term unem-
ployed and other disadvantaged groups. The eﬀects of the recent reduction of
employers’ social security contributions have been estimated in a recent IMF
2The ﬁgures unfortunately refer to oﬃcial marital status and may give a partially biased
view of the reality as employment rates in de facto couples are very similar to those of married
couples.
3According to recent statistics, there are approximately 1,700,000 married women of work-
ing age in Belgium in 2001. The corresponding ﬁgure for single women is 783,000. This ﬁgure,
however, also includes females living in de facto couples.
2analysis (IMF, 2001). Using a demand driven aggregated model and reasonable
hypotheses of labour demand elasticity, IMF economists have estimated that the
forecasted reduction in the tax wedge will bring about an increase in the em-
ployment rate of 1 percentage point, which is in line with previous estimations
based on HERMES.
In recent years, however, important reforms have tried to tackle the inactivity
trap from a labour supply perspective. Starting from 1999 the federal socialist-
liberal government (the green party which was part of the ﬁrst government
coalition is no longer in power in the second mandate) has taken major steps
towards further reduction of the tax burden on labour.
The ﬁrst measure was the introduction of substantial reductions in employ-
ees’ Social Security Contributions (SSC) for low paid workers. In a second step
the government has passed a bill for the progressive abolition of the Contribu-
tion Complémentaire de Crise (CCC), an additional surcharge that had been
introduced during the tough budgetary crisis of the early 90s. The employees’
SSC reduction has increased steadily in the period 2001-2004, reaching 104 EUR
per month, but it is targeted at low skilled workers and phased out for higher
earnings.
Notwithstanding the large stock of public debt, the Belgian government de-
cided that by 2001 the macroeconomic conditions and the status of public ﬁ-
nance allowed for a second reform of the personal income tax4,w h i c h ,a m o n g s t
other purposes, included a positive eﬀect on labour supply. The reform was
estimated to have a budgetary cost of 3.33 billion EUR, corresponding to a
decrease in tax revenue by almost 10%.
This paper assesses the impact of the 2001 Belgian tax reform on the labour
market, focusing on the labour supply of females living in couples: arguably the
group with the highest labour supply potential. Using a methodology largely
exploited in the recent economic literature on ex ante evaluation of tax beneﬁt
reforms, this paper signiﬁcantly extends previous static analyses, such as those
performed in Decoster et al. (2002) and Valenduc (2002) for the 1988 and 2001
Belgian tax reform respectively. Employment dynamics, so far analysed in the
framework of partial equilibrium macro-models, such as in Saintrain (2002),
are hence integrated into our welfare analysis of the tax reform, using a fully
structural supply-driven micro-economic approach.
2 Recent tax-beneﬁtr e f o r m si nt h eE U
Major welfare state developments were achieved in Europe between the end of
the 60s and the early 70s. In the fast growing European economies of the post-
war era, the main concerns were to assure income protection against labour
market risks as well as to guarantee fair income distribution and minimum
standards of living, through a sophisticated tax beneﬁt system and tight labour
4De Callataÿ (2002) argues that the term ‘tax reform’ is partially misleading given the
substantial continuity of the new tax code with the previous one, and prefers the term ‘tax
reduction’.
3market legislation. Some 30 years later, in a profoundly changed economic
environment, the same instruments that were once viewed as the foundations of
the European welfare state, are increasingly seen as one of the causes of Europe’s
persistently low employment performance. On the one hand generous income
assistance and unemployment beneﬁts reduce the ﬁnancial distress of inactivity,
whilst on the other hand heavy tax burdens reduce the ﬁnancial incentives to
take up work, especially for less productive workers. Potential ﬁnancial gains
to taking up a job are hence very limited, if not negative, generating inactivity
and poverty traps5.
The situation is particularly dramatic in continental Europe, which heav-
ily depends on a high wage strategy for its labour contribution ﬁnanced and
insurance based Bismarkian welfare state, with generous passive work-related
transfers, and relatively sticky labour markets characterized by rigidly struc-
tured industrial relations (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The fact that labour market
performance of less skilled workers has been particularly poor in these countries
is conﬁrmed by a recent study of Davieri and Tabellini (2000). The authors
argue that the heavy burden in terms of labour costs, combined with an inter-
mediate degree of labour market centralization is the main cause of persisting
poor performances.
The driving forces behind these trends are well known: exactly at the time
when the architecture of the western welfare state was ﬁnalized, the economic
and social environment that had fostered its growth started to deteriorate. The
dynamic industrial production, based on ever increasing economies of scale and
on the abundance of raw materials, started to slow down, while at the same
time household demand for industrial goods showed the ﬁrst signs of saturation;
changing gender roles signiﬁcantly increased family instability and the poverty
risk and growing female labour supply boosted unemployment rates; techno-
logical change and globalization favoured industrial delocalization; lower labour
productivity in the service sector coupled with high labour costs designed to
ﬁnance the welfare state did not allow for a rapid absorption of less productive
workers, trapping them in poverty.
The perceived failure of the social model built throughout the 60-70s and the
growing budgetary costs of the welfare state prompted neo-liberal tax reforms
in many EU countries. After the budgetary eﬀorts connected to the Maastricht
criteria, the last 5 years have witnessed many EU countries paying back the
dividend of the ﬁnancial restrictiveness of the early 90s through more or less
extensive tax cuts. The reforms that have recently interested EU countries have
been seen by some as pragmatic responses to growing pressures coming from
globalization, the need to reduce the tax burden on labour and the constraints
imposed by the Maastricht treaty, rather than the consequences of an ideological
swing (Bernardi and Profeta, 2004). In this respect it should be noted that
reforms have been carried forward by both left and right wing majorities. On
the other hand, the role of workfare as the dominating paradigm of recent tax-
5For a detailed discussion of inactivity and poverty traps at the European level, see Périvier
(2003).
4beneﬁt reforms clearly marks the distance with respect to more traditional left
wing values: equity and income redistribution are less of a political priority
than they used to be. In other words, the recent reforms witness the softening
of ideological resistance to workfare policies 6 and passive compensation for the
low skilled is being complemented by more or less generous transfers aimed at
making work pay, through low wage subsidies.
In this section we will review the most signiﬁcant recent tax reforms in the
EU, paying particular attention to the diﬀerent schemes of in-work beneﬁts
(IWB) put in place.
2.1 Recent tax reforms in the EU
This section will describe the most signiﬁcant reforms recently implemented (or
planned ) in the EU. We will focus on the experience of Germany, the Nether-
lands and Italy. Other signiﬁcant reforms were introduced in Scandinavian
countries (namely Sweden and Denmark) almost 10 years ago, and minor re-
forms were implemented in France, Austria and Spain. For a detailed review of
these reforms, see Sterdyniak (2003) and Bernardi and Profeta (2004).
2.1.1 Germany
As part of the Agenda 2010, a comprehensive package of measures to re-launch
the German economy, in 2001 the German parliament has adopted a large reform
of the income tax system raising the basic personal allowance and signiﬁcantly
lowering tax rates (Bundesregierung, 2004). The oﬃcial objective of the reform
is to decrease the overall tax burden, especially on low-paid workers, in order
to stimulate employment. The reform is progressively being phased in over
the 2000-2005 period. By 2005, the tax rate in the ﬁrst tax bracket should
have fallen to 15% (from 22.9% in 2000) while the top rate should have been
cut to 42% (from 51% in 2000) in accordance with international standards.
The personal income tax allowance will be increased from 6,902 up to 7,664
EUR in 2005, but will continue to be non-refundable. Hence, the maximum
net gain obtained in the ﬁrst tax bracket will be around 1,115 EUR per year.
6The key element behind the introduction of workfare policies, notably the EITC in the
US, was conservative Americans’ long standing phobia for a state fostering welfare depen-
dency instead of self suﬃciency and responsibility. Workfare, instead of welfare became the
ideological notion behind welfare reforms promoted by the new conservative administrations
that came in force in the US and a few years later in the UK (Peck, 1998).
Given such an uncomfortable “ideological inheritance”, it is not surprising that workfare
policies have long been discredited by the European socialist parties and left wing intellec-
tuals as concealed strategies to scale back the welfare state or to govern social conﬂicts by
subordinating social policy to the needs of ﬂexible labour markets (Jessop, 1996).
Welfare to work, nevertheless, was successfully integrated in Clinton’s welfare reform act
and is one of the key elements of Blair’s New Labour’s pragmatic view of modern welfare states
(Giddens, 1998). As the original ideological background fades away, several governments in
continental Europe have also started to view workfare policies as a necessary evolution for a
welfare state that faces multiple pressures due to deindustrialisation, globalisation, and family
instability.
5In addition, several proposals have been made to subsidize low-wage earners
through extended exemptions from social contribution payments. Three of them
have ranked high on the German political agenda and have been reviewed by
Bonin, Kempe and Schneider (2002). Interestingly enough, with respect to
the previous discussion on individual vs. family-based policies, two of these
proposals employ subsidy schemes based on individual earnings whereas the
third subsidy derives from a joint income assessment in the couple. The CSU
(resp. SPD) proposal consists in exempting monthly earnings below 400 EUR
(resp. 510) from contributions to social insurance, which raises the 2002 income
bound by 75 EUR, and in phasing out the exemption until gross earnings reach
800 EUR (resp. 1280). Under the other policy model (the so-called Mainzer
model), entitlement to the reduction depends on a joint assessment of household
labour income and the lower and upper bounds of the phase-out region are
respectively 650 and 1590 EUR for singles and twice these amounts for couples.
This way, the policy covers a wider range of earnings, including a large share of
one-earner couples. Bonin, Kempe and Schneider ﬁnd very small estimates for
the wage elasticities and conclude that these subsidy policies will not be very
eﬀective. Indeed, although the 400 and 800 EUR bounds have been applied
since April 2003, new orientations tend to privilege workfare concepts, that is,
to make social beneﬁts conditional on atypical part-time work (‘mini-jobs’).
2.1.2 The Netherlands
The Netherlands has also introduced an important tax reform in 2001 (Minis-
terie van Financiën, 2001). The reform implied a modular structure according
to which incomes are taxed separately according to their source. The new tax
system explicitly recognizes the diﬀerence between more and less mobile pro-
ductive factors: income from labour, pensions and imputed rents from owner
occupied dwellings are globally taxed under one taxing regime. Income from
capital on the other hand is imputed from total wealth (an eﬀective interest
rate of 4% is assumed), irrespective of the composition of the portfolio, and
taxed at a ﬂat rate of 30%. Finally, the new system aligns the tax burden on
diﬀerent forms of capital income, thus reducing tax induced distortions in the
capital markets, but continues to diﬀerently tax diﬀerent sources of income. At
the same time, however, the reform has signiﬁcantly decreased the tax burden
on labour income, by increasing tax credits for children and reducing marginal
tax rates: new minimum and maximum marginal tax rates are 33 and 52%
(prior to the 2001 reform the highest marginal tax rate was at 60%). A feature
that was particularly discouraging to female employment was the existence of
a transferable personal tax deduction. If one of the partners did not work, the
credit could be transferred to the other partner. Given that females are more
often the secondary earner in a couple, the measure introduced a signiﬁcant
disincentive for women to work over a certain threshold (which, according to
Das and Van Soest (2000) partially explains the widespread diﬀusion of very
short working hours in the Netherlands).
Another signiﬁcant change was the alignment of the personal deduction for
6one-earner and two-earner families. The new reform has limited the scope for
tax credit transfers between spouses and has introduced an individualized tax
credit. The latter will be analyzed in greater detail in the following section.
2.1.3 Italy
The reform of the tax system that is being studied by the Italian government is
also of interest to the present paper (although the tax bill has not yet been ap-
proved by parliament) as it arguably represents the most neo-liberal tax reform
that any country in continental Europe is currently planning to introduce. The
reform of the tax system was one of the major pre-electoral engagements of the
Berlusconi government. Despite the business cycle dynamics, the considerable
deterioration of public ﬁnance in the ﬁrst years of the mandate and the recent
resignation of the ﬁnance minister, the governing coalition seems determined to
undertake the considerable reduction in the tax burden. It is still diﬃcult to
have a deﬁnite picture of the shape of the tax reform. The last relevant parlia-
mentary act dates back to the 21st December 2001. Parliament adopted a so
called "framework law", by which it charged the government with elaborating a
reform proposal within the general framework conditions dictated by parliament
itself. Baldini and Bosi (2002), relying on the text of the framework law and the
parliamentary text to introduce the bill, describe the most likely features of the
new tax system and estimate its distributional impact. The reform is clearly
inspired by the Flat Rate Tax (FRT) model, yet it is diﬀerent from the most
basic model on several aspects. In the ﬁrst place, existing tax schedules will
collapse into two tax brackets: the marginal tax rate will be at 23% between 0
and 100,000 EUR and at 33% thereafter7.
The progressivity of the tax system will be assured by a series of (non-
refundable) tax credits. Diﬀerently from the standard FRT model, however,
the tax credits will vary in accordance with personal labour market status (i.e.
inactive, employee or self-employed) and family conditions (number of depen-
dents). The maximum individual tax credit (or no-tax area, NTA hereafter)
could thus vary from 3,000 EUR for an inactive single to around 11,000 EUR
for an employee with dependent partner and one dependent child (3,000 EUR
as a basic tax credit plus 4,000 EUR as a tax credit on employment income
and 2,000 EUR for each dependent family member). Beyond the NTA, the tax
credit will be tapered away at a rate of probably 40-50%, meaning that no tax
credit will be available for a tax payer with taxable income around 35-40,000
EUR (the ﬁgure refers to an employee with two dependent family members).
The authors conclude that the tax reform will be a Pareto improvement,
also due to a clause that will make the old system applicable, should the latter
be more advantageous for the taxpayer. Yet, the beneﬁts of the reform will be
concentrated on the lower and upper part of the distribution, with particular
beneﬁts delivered to the self-employed and two-earner families with few or no
7According to Baldini and Bosi (2002) taxes in the new system will be ﬂat-rate for about
99% of taxpayers.
7children8. The gains, on the contrary, will be particularly limited for the wide
range of households in the middle of the distribution. However, the dynamic
eﬀects of the reform remain unexplored, but it seems likely that it will have a
positive impact on labour supply of secondary earners.
2.2 In-work beneﬁts: towards a European Model?
In-work beneﬁts (IWB) are in-work conditional transfers aimed at increasing
the ﬁnancial incentive to take up work, while maintaining a socially acceptable
distribution of income. IWBs are a key element of supply-side workfare policies,
which aim at promoting self-suﬃciency. More in general, IWBs may be seen as
hybrid instruments designed to reshape the link between employment, solidarity
and social justice in the new century’s welfare state. Given their hybrid nature,
it should not come as a surprise that at least two broad motivations may be put
forward to justify their implementation (Pearson, 2002):
(i) economic inclusion: i.e. the economic mainstreaming of society’s most
vulnerable individuals, with positive feedbacks coming from decreased spending
on income maintenance and poverty related social problems like poor health or
crime;
(ii) redistribution: i.e. increasing the ﬁnancial resources of the weakest frac-
tion of the population, with positive feedbacks coming from increased social
cohesion.
Nevertheless, the eligibility conditions, the overall design, the generosity and
the relative importance attached to employment per se and redistribution vary
signiﬁcantly across countries that have implemented such beneﬁts. In particular,
there is a substantial diﬀerence between a ﬁrst generation of IWB (implemented
in Anglo-Saxon countries) and a second generation of IWB recently implemented
in Continental European countries.
It may be argued that IWB in Continental Europe have been diﬀerently “tai-
lored” to respond to national diﬀerences in the framework conditions9.H o w -
ever, political constraints and social acceptance of reforms also diﬀer profoundly
across countries, so that it should not come as a surprise that IWB have had
varying degrees of success across the countries which have implemented them.
In particular, IWB in Continental Europe tend to be individualized and uni-
versal measures reﬂecting a widespread distate for means-tested measures. The
main drawback is of course that the amount of the beneﬁtt e n d st ob em u c h
lower.
In the following paragraphs we brieﬂy analyze some of the instruments re-
cently implemented or reformed in EU countries, such as the Working Fam-
ily Tax Credit (WFTC) in the UK and the Prime Pour l’Emploi (PPE) in
France, while the appendix presents information on the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) in the US and on the Canadian experimental Self-Suﬃciency
8It should be noted that Italy already presents the lowest level of social support for children:
most of the beneﬁts are delivered through the tax system as there is no universal child beneﬁt.
9Pearson (2002) mentions amongst other factors a more compact income and wage distri-
bution and relatively higher Eﬀective Marginal Tax Rates.
8Programme (SSP). The EITC, in particular, is a measure which has largely in-
spired the WFTC and indeed all existing in-work tax credits. A short overview
of these measures aims at showing the diﬀerences between Anglo-Saxon mea-
sures and the IWBs recently implemented in Europe, in order to better under-
stand the originality of the Belgian measure contained in the 2001 Tax Reform
package.
2.2.1 The British Working Family Tax Credit
In the late 90s, the WFTC replaced the FC which had been introduced in 1986
as a form of support for low-income working parents. The WFTC which, relative
to the FC, substantially increased the amount of the beneﬁt, is conditional on
working at least 16 hours per week, and not 24 as was the rule before 1992. In
2003, the WFTC was redesigned: social assistance for children (which is added
to the universal child beneﬁt) was made means tested and not conditional on
the employment status of parents, whereas the in-work beneﬁt was extended to
people without children. The WFTC was therefore split into a Child Tax Credit
(CTC) and a Working Tax Credit (WTC), which entails a clearer separation of
anti-poverty and Making-Work-Pay (MWP) measures.
The new WTC is available to both singles and couples with or without
children, although amounts vary according to family situation. Couples and
lone parents are entitled to a maximum refundable credit of £3,025 per year,
plus a bonus of £620 per year for those working 30 hours or more or more a
week. Moreover, families with children in which all adults work, care or are
disabled may receive help to cover costs of approved child care. The child
care tax credit element of the working tax credit, which also characterized the
WFTC, covers 70% of approved child-care costs below a generous maximum fee
(£135 a week for those with one child under 16). The focus on child care cost is
an interesting distinctive feature of the British in-work beneﬁt, since it tackles
one of the biggest impediments to women to taking up work.
Families with annual incomes below £5,060 are entitled to the full amount;
at income levels above this threshold a taper of 37% reduces entitlement. The
latter is exhausted at around £14,911 for a lone parent or a couple with or
without children working full-time and at slightly less for singles. The crucial
element of the WFTC and similar measures in the US and Canada is the income
assessment at the household level. As we shall see, the latter tends to discourage
secondary earners in couples, i.e. mostly females.
2.2.2 The French Prime Pour l’Emploi
In continental Europe and in Scandinavian countries, disincentives to take up
paid work may be even stronger, due to the relative generosity of the welfare
state. Up to 1998, France, for example, found itself in a paradoxical situation: an
inactive person receiving the Revenu Minimum d’Insertion (RMI) was receiving
more than a worker working half time at minimum wage.
Working full-time at the minimum wage, on the other hand, brought about
9a ﬁnancial gain of about C =230. Hardly a signiﬁcant incentive to take up work,
especially if we consider the ﬁxed costs a worker incurs when taking up a job.
Such an inactivity trap was due to the fact that earned income was taken into
account in the income test to compute housing allowance eligibility, whereas
the RMI was disregarded (Périvier, 2003). In 2000, the French government
reformed the housing allowance and introduced an in-work beneﬁt, the Prime
Pour l’Emploi.
To be eligible, at least one member of the household must be employed,
taxable income must be lower than a certain amount (C =30,050for a couple with
two children) and individual earnings must be between C =3,265 and C =23,207 per
year.
An interesting feature of the PPE is that it is strictly connected to the num-
ber of hours worked: earnings are in fact recomputed in full time equivalent, so
that only unskilled workers with low hourly earnings are targeted, clearly dis-
tinguishing between low skills and low eﬀorts. A full-time worker may therefore
be eligible to a maximum beneﬁto fC =443 per year, whereas a part-time worker
has the right to a maximum of C =322 per year.
In addition, the French PPE presents some hybrid features: it is means tested
on household income, but at the same time it is individualized in the sense that
it is also conditional on individual earnings and more than one person in the
household may be eligible.
2.2.3 The Dutch Arbeidskorting and the Italian No-Tax Area
The dislike for means-testing is more evident in the reform introduced in the
Netherlands in 2001. Up to the introduction of the reform, taxpayers could
beneﬁt from a tax allowance of 12% of taxable income (up to a maximum of
C =1,465). Such a tax allowance was more generous for taxpayers with high earn-
ing capacity, and has hence been replaced by a more generous non refundable
employment tax credit: the arbeidskorting. The maximum amount of the tax
credit is C =920, which is reached, with a progressive phase-in, at C =15,117, i.e.
the full-year equivalent of a full-time at minimum wage. One of the character-
istics of the Dutch tax credit is the lack of phase-out: all people in employment
are eligible for the tax credit.
The tax reform proposal currently elaborated by the Italian government is
quite similar. The No-Tax Area (NTA) will be a non refundable tax credit
which is phased out after attaining a certain maximum value10.M o r e o v e r ,
the size of the tax credit will change according to the employment situation,
with an additional no tax zone for employment income of about C =2,000. The
NTA, however, will also consider the number of dependants - thus partially
reintroducing the family dimension. Such additional employment disregard may
well be considered, just like the arbeidskorting, an in-work beneﬁt.
Diﬀerently from IWB in traditional terms, however, the tax credits are not
refundable, so that employees and self-employed workers can only beneﬁtu p
10Technically speaking the credit is not phased in, but since the credit is not refundable,
the amount of the actual credit increases with income before attaining a maximum.
10to the amount of tax paid. As we will see this represents the main innovative
aspect of the Belgian measure, which is not only totally individualized, but also
refundable.
3 Assessing ﬁscal and welfare reforms from a
labour supply perspective: methodological frame-
works and empirical ﬁndings
The deep ﬁscal reforms that have been implemented in the US and EU countries
in the last decades have fostered a growing literature on the impact of changes
in the budget constraint on labour market performance. Techniques based on
microdata not only allow for a full costs and beneﬁts assessment of economic
reforms, but also for better estimates of potential labour supply eﬀects. The
main alternative is represented by aggregated models of labour supply and de-
mand which often provide forecasts based on average elasticity estimations. The
relative magnitude of substitution and income eﬀects are diﬀerent across the dis-
tribution of incomes, and even small aggregate variations in labour supply could
correspond to signiﬁcant movements in and out of the labour force and, to a
smaller extent, between part time and full time employment. Since those op-
posite movements typically concern diﬀerent types of workers, simply capturing
aggregated shifts in the employment rate risks not being very informative on
the welfare impact of a reform. Moreover, as most reforms are not concerned
with increasing the employment rate per se, but mainly with tackling situations
of welfare dependency and poverty traps, as well as increasing employment in
particularly disfavoured groups (women, youngsters or older-aged workers), the
micro approach allows for a deeper understanding of movements into and out
of the labour market and thus permits a full assessment of policy instruments
with respect to objectives pursued.
In recent years a variety of methodological approaches have been used for
in-depth analysis of the labour supply impact of tax reforms. Such studies have
been of crucial importance to evaluate policy measures in terms of costs and
beneﬁts and potential distortions on the behaviour of diﬀerent social groups,
both in an ex-ante and ex-post perspective. Following Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999), at least three diﬀerent approaches have been used in the literature for
the estimation of the eﬀects of tax reforms on labour supply: the experimental
approach, the natural experiment approach and the structural approach. Before
providing an overview of the results, it may be useful to brieﬂyd e s c r i b et h e s e
methodologies and discuss their advantages as well as their drawbacks.
3.1 Experimental Approach
The experimental approach starts out from an arrangement of conditions or
procedures deﬁned to the purpose of testing some hypotheses. The design of
the experiment focuses on the prior conditions themselves and on the outcome
11or results of the experiment. The outcome is measured as the diﬀerence in the
ex-ante and ex-post status of the group participating in the experiment and
of the control group. In order to isolate all external eﬀects and the eﬀect of
participating in the experiment, the control group diﬀers from the experiment
group as regards the participation in the procedure, but otherwise it presents
identical measurable characteristics.
Although fairly common in exact sciences and indeed in medicine to test
the eﬀectiveness of medicaments, the use of the experimental approach is rather
limited in social sciences, principally due to the huge costs of setting up such ex-
periments on a statistically signiﬁcant scale. The most signiﬁcant exeptions are
represented by the New Jersey negative income tax experiment and eventually
by the Seattle and Denver Income Mantainance Experiments (SIME/DIME) in
the late 70s.
In more recent years Canada introduced the experimental Self Suﬃciency
Programme (see appendix). The experimental approach allowed to closely fol-
low the panel of the preselected treated and control groups, thus facilitating the
estimation of the impact. According to Card and Robins (1996), the adjusted
impact of the SSP on full employment probability was in the order of 11% after
the third quarter. Such an astonishing result must nevertheless be interpreted
cautiously: on the one, hand the Canadian SSP oﬀered an extremely generous
beneﬁt which is unlikely to be set up on a non-experimental basis, on the other
hand, “it appears that recipients are taking jobs that pay relatively low wages,
within $1.00 and $3.00 per hour above the minimum wage. Thus, unless sig-
niﬁcant wage progression occurs during the three-year period of eligibility, it is
possible that many recipients will return to welfare when the supplement ends”
(Card and Robins, 1996).
3.2 Natural Experiment Approach
The natural experiment approach (NEA) shares with the EA the characteristic
that estimation is based on comparison between a participating group and a
control group. Diﬀerently from the pure EA, however, the control group is not
pre-selected and the experiment is not set up ex-ante, but results “naturally”
follow from some variation of the status (a ﬁscal or a welfare reform, for example)
of the environment that aﬀects one group, but not the control group. It follows
that the control group is never exactly identical to the experimental group, but
may be selected in order to maximize its resemblance to the participating group.
The eﬀect of the reform is estimated by comparing the diﬀerences between
the initial and terminal conditions (i.e. respectively in t=1 and t=2) of both
the experiment and the control group; therefore the methodology is sometimes
referred to as “diﬀerence in diﬀerences”. To be more speciﬁc, let us suppose
that a population of N individuals is divided into two sub-populations A and C
which are respectively the group aﬀected by the reform and the control group.
The estimated eﬀect of the reform is then simply:
(E{A,1} − E{A,2}) − (E{C,1} − E{C,2})
12i.e. the diﬀerence in ex-ante and ex-post employment rates (or e.g. poverty
rates if we were to assess redistribution), net of the variation in employment
rate which is not due to the reform.
The NEA is a fairly common methodology in economic analysis: changes
in the status of the environment that diﬀerently aﬀect groups of people are
indeed rather frequent in ﬁscal, social and employment policy. Successive series
of cross-section data or panel data are also largely available, so that the NEA
allows for a widely accessible estimation technique, provided that a valid control
group may be identiﬁed. Indeed, the approach heavily relies on two restrictive
assumptions: (i) common time eﬀect and (ii) no composition changes.
Another shortcoming of such an approach is the impossibility of generalizing
results to measures that have not yet been introduced, and hence to provide ex-
ante estimations of potential labour market eﬀects.
Eissa (1995) estimates the labour supply eﬀect of the 1986 Tax Reform Act
(TRA-86) on a sub-sample of married women. Her analysis is based on a com-
parison of labour market responses of earners in the 99th percentile — the most
aﬀected by the tax rebates — to those of the almost unaﬀected 75th percentile
earners. Eissa and Liebman (1996) more speciﬁcally analyse the labour supply
responses of women with children to the EITC, using women without children
as a control group. The method of the diﬀerence in diﬀerences is applied for
several subgroups of women: low skilled women, medium skilled women and
high skilled women. In both cases, results using the NEA approach compare
well with results based on diﬀerent methodologies (infra).
3.3 Structural approach
The development of a structural model is needed to produce reliable econometric
estimations of behavioral responses in situations when post-reform eﬀects are
not observable.
Simple “reduced-form models”, widely used in the past, are biased, as they
do not consider the more complex nature of income and substitution eﬀects in
sophisticated tax beneﬁt environments which cause non-convexities, concavities
and discontinuities in budget sets (Hausman, 1985a). Moreover, the parameters
of “reduced-form” equations are typically inﬂuenced by the existing “tax bene-
ﬁt” environment and they may not be used to predict behavioral responses to
policy reforms (Heckman, 1993).
The application of a progressive tax schedule to earned income is a typical
example of the methodological problem that may be encountered. As explained
in Hausman (1985b), traditional Slutsky relationships do not hold in a situation
in which the net wage changes with the amount of labour oﬀered and average
and marginal wages diﬀer.
Moreover, in several OECD countries the simultaneous existence of income
maintenance programmes and progressive taxation produce non-convexities and
concavities in the budget set that are responsible for discontinuities in the labour
supply curve.
13The structural approach relies on a labour supply model and optimizing
behaviour assumption, subject to a household budget constraint. Rational be-
haviour by the household implies that the household determines the labour sup-
ply level that maximizes utility given the available working opportunities and
the budget constraint. Within such a utility maximizing framework, households’
preferences may be estimated based on observed behaviour through a maximum
likelihood procedure. Once the parameters that characterize taste for income
and leisure are recovered, it is possible to estimate the magnitude of behavioral
responses to a variation in the budget constraint that is triggered by a change
in the tax and beneﬁt legislation, by simply comparing the observed ex-ante
labour supply to the labour supply that would maximize household utility after
the reform has been introduced.
The advantage of the structural model approach is that it allows for the
simulation of behavioral responses to a very wide set of potential reforms with
relatively low computational costs: it therefore represents a ﬂexible and inexpen-
sive tool for ex-ante policy analysis. Using a fully structural approach, MaCurdy
et al. (1990) propose two diﬀerent methodologies for estimating a continuous
labour supply function: the piecewise linearization of the budget constraint —
already proposed by Burtless and Hausman (1987) — and the approximation
of the budget constraint through a diﬀerentiable function. Both methodologies
provide comparable results, but the approximation of the budget constraint is
more straightforward, since the piecewise linearization relies on a N-tuple ML
Tobit estimation depending on the number of segments with which the budget
constraint is approximated (N). Nevertheless, both methodologies are compu-
tationally cumbersome even in the simplest case, let alone in the more complex
cases in which multiple welfare programme participation, the social stigma of
beneﬁt take-up and the ﬁxed cost of labour supply are considered.
Recently, however, ap r i o r ianalysis of the eﬀects of tax and beneﬁtr e f o r m s
has witnessed an increase in the use of discrete choice labour supply functions.
Such models explicitely recognise the institutional constraints on labour supply
which result in a limited set of working time alternatives (normally, part-time, 3
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full-time and full-time). Most importantly, however, the computational burden
of estimating labour supply functions boils down to ML estimation of a more or
less articulated conditional logit funct i o n ,a f t e rt h ed i s po s a b l ei n c o m eo fd i ﬀerent
working time options have been computed through a tax-beneﬁt simulation
model. The econometric model underlying the discrete hours labour supply
approach is further detailed in section 4. The following section will explore in
some detail recent empirical ﬁndings related to the eﬀects of the aforementioned
tax and beneﬁt reforms on labour supply.
3.4 Survey of empirical results
Since the pioneering work of Marvin Koster (Koster, 1967), empirical analysis
of the eﬀects of tax legislation on labour supply have become a solid tradition in
economic literature. Much of the US literature assesses the eﬀect of the TRA-
86 in general and of the EITC in particular. Hausman and Poterba (1987),
14for example, provide an estimate of the reaction of household savings behavior
and labour supply following the 1986 TRA. Applying preference parameters
estimated in previous work (Hausman, 1981), the authors predict an elasticity
of 0.9 for the average married man. The labour supply elasticity is signiﬁcantly
larger for married women (2.64), but most of the variation is due to the change
in participation decision, rather than to variations at the margin.
Compared to Hausman and Poterba (1987), Eissa (1995) ﬁnds more modest
labour supply responses for married women (0.8). Using the same methodology
Eissa (1996) ﬁnds almost no response in the sub-sample of married men11.
In the aforementioned study of Eissa and Liebman (1996) the labour supply
impact of the EITC is estimated at 2.8%, witch matches closely the estimate by
Hausman and Poterba for married women.
Scholz (1996) focuses on the analysis of the participation choice. Using a
tax beneﬁt microsimulation model, he estimates through a probit model the
relative importance of the net wage to explain the change in activity status.
The comparison of the eﬀect of the coeﬃcients on pre and post 1993 EITC
expansion, leads Scholz to conclude that the EITC reform increased the odds of
being in activity by 6.6 points for single primary earners, 0.4 ponts for primary
earners in two-parent families and a decreases of the odds by 5.0 percentage
points for secondary earners.
Scholz’s analysis also uses the labour supply elasticity estimates of Hausman
(1981), Triest (1990) and MaCurdy et al. (1990) to approximate the eﬀect of the
EITC alone on hours worked. He concludes that although the EITC expansion
has a negative eﬀect on hours worked by earners already in employment, it will
be more than compensated by the participation eﬀect.
The study by Scholz is crucial as it clearly sets out the advantages and dis-
advantages of most in-work beneﬁts: whereas the substitution eﬀect for inactive
people tends to increase ﬁnancial incentives to take up employment under the
EITC or similar measures, the combined working of substitution and income
eﬀect may have negative eﬀects both on participation of secondary workers and
on hours worked, depending on the distribution of earners over the phase-in,
ﬂat and phase-out regions.
Concerning the Canadian SSP, several interesting results were recently drawn,
although information collection is still going on and more information about the
long term eﬀects of the measure is yet to be made available. For preliminary
results, see to the aforementioned analysis by Card and Robins (1996).
For the British experience, conclusions on the WFTC closely match those
on the EITC. Focusing on the sub-sample of lone mothers, Bingley and Walker
(1997) study the impact on labour supply of the Family Credit using a multino-
mial model which estimates utility variations associated to moves across the
employment statuses (non-participation, part-time and full-time). The authors
estimate that a £10 increase in the level of weekly beneﬁt (which was previously
11Both studies, however, measure the impact of the reform on labour supply of high income
groups, who are not likely to signiﬁcantly further increase their labour supply. In this respect,
the results of the analysis should be interpreted cautiously, as pointed out by Blundell and
MaCurdy (1999).
15conditional on working at least 24 hours) would increase participation by 1.3
percentage points, whilst leaving the percentage of full-time workers unchanged.
Finally, several recent papers, adopt a discrete hours labour supply model,
very similar to the one proposed in the present paper. Based on Van Soest
(1995), Keane and Moﬃt (1998) and Hoynes (1996) critically assess the impact
of welfare programme participation on labour supply of American mothers. For
the UK, Blundell et al. (2000) also develop a full structural model of discrete-
hours labour supply and estimate the impact of the transition from the FC to
the WFTC. In their analysis they use a ML multinomial probit model to esti-
mate preference parameters for consumption and leisure of households supplying
labour at discrete levels (0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50). They ﬁnd evidence of an increase
in labour market participation of lone parents (+2.2 percentage points) and to
a lesser extent of men, although it is partially oﬀset by a reduction in the hours
supplied (0.2% of the sample was predicted to move from full-time to part-time
employment). Similarly to Scholz, they also estimate that females in couples
are likely to reduce their work eﬀorts:0.57% of the sub-sample would move into
inactivity, whereas the number of hours worked is estimated to decrease by
0.18%.
For the Netherlands, Das and Van Soest (2000) apply the same methodology
to estimate the labour market impact of the tax reform bill eventually passed by
parliament and described above. They conclude that the tax reform will have a
signiﬁcant impact on female labour supply: average working hours will increase
by over 4%, although much of the increase will be driven by a change in the
participation rate (1.48%).
Bargain and Terraz (2003) and Bargain (2004) estimate the impact of the
French PPE and alternative beneﬁt designs on the employment of women living
in de facto couples and predict relatively small eﬀects (about 20,000 females,
i.e. 0.45% of potentially active females in couples).
Concerning Germany, discrete hours labour supply and multinomial logit
models are again used in the aforementioned analysis by Bonin, Kempe and
Schneider (2002) of the impact of diﬀerent low wage subsidy proposals on the
German labour market, and by Haan and Steiner (2004) to evaluate the dynamic
eﬀects of the Agenda 2010 tax reform. The latter estimate that the reduction
of the tax burden on labour is likely to increase total labour supply by around
160,000 units, more or less evenly shared between men and women.
Remarkably, in the case of Italy, the impact of a revenue-neutral FRT tax
reform (with and without negative income tax) on female labour supply was
estimated by Aaberge et al. (1997), almost 4 years before such a proposal be-
gun to be discussed. The revenue neutral reform analyzed by Aaberge et al.
(1997) implied an equivalent tax rate of 23.3% - based on the 1992 tax beneﬁt
legislation. The microsimulation results suggest that participation is likely to
decrease, but the total amount of hours is likely to increase. The latter result
is probably due to the fact that average tax rates increase, especially for house-
holds with the lowest earning capacity, but the marginal tax rate decreases for
most households. Aaberge et al (1997), moreover, do not use a discrete hours
approach: labour supply may vary almost continuously, but the ﬁnite set of
16available options is represented through a distribution of working typologies
characterised by the working time, wage and other characteristics. The op-
portunity set, moreover, also includes the probability of being involountarily
unemployed, which represents a signiﬁcant evolution of the pure supply side
model.
Concerning Belgium, few studies have addressed the potential eﬀects of the
2001 tax reform. Valenduc (2002) analyses the reform in purely static terms and
focuses on the change in marginal and eﬀective tax rates as well as changes in
replacement rates, concluding that the reform is likely to have a positive impact
on labour supply (although the increase in replacement rates is not concentrated
where poverty traps are most signiﬁcant). Saintrain (2002), on the other hand,
uses a macro model to estimate the impact of the reform. The model he uses
is almost totally demand-driven (although the author concedes that the tax
reform could bring about a slight increase in labour supply, and thus a decrease
in the NAIRU12). The author argues that the reform could bring about a partial
decrease in the wage wedge, thus increasing the demand for labour13.A c c o r d i n g
to estimates using the macro model of the Federal Planning Bureau (HERMES),
potential additional employment could be at around 20,000 units. We are not
aware of any micro-based assessment of potential labour supply eﬀects of the
reform.
4 The 2001 Belgian Tax Reform
In August 2001 the Belgian Parliament passed a Tax Reform bill (Loi du 10 août
2001), which implemented the ﬁscal reform announced by the federal govern-
ment in its Federal Policy Plan of 17th October 2000. The reform is structured
into four main pillars (or axes) corresponding to the following policy objectives:
1. to reduce the ﬁscal burden on labour income
2. to design a ﬁscal legislation that is neutral with respect to marital status
3. to improve the way dependent children are taken into account by the tax
system
4. to promote sustainable development through an environmentally sound
taxation.
The reform is being phased in progressively between 2001 and 2005. Of
particular interest to the present study are the measures contained in the ﬁrst
two pillars, namely: (1) the earned income tax credit - crédit d’impôt pour les
bas revenus d’activité profesionnelle (CIBRAP hereafter); (2) the increase in
deductions for working expenses; (3) the broadening of the central tax brackets;
(4) the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates and (5) the alignment of the
tax exempt income quotas for singles and married couples. These measures,
12Non-accelerating inﬂation rate of unemployment.
13Note that this approach is totally diﬀerent from our framework. After estimating a labour
supply model (infra), we estimate the impact of the ﬁscal shock, assuming that all the decrease
in income tax will correspond to an increase in the net wage that leaves the gross wage
unaﬀected.
17representing together around 85% of the cost of the reform, will be examined
in depth in the following sections. For details on the other measures, as well as
on the reform of corporate taxation, implemented through a second tax bill in
2002 (Loi du 24 décembre 2002) see Ministère de Finances (2002a), Ministère
de Finances (2003), Caray (2003) and Valenduc (2002).
4.0.1 The CIBRAP
The CIBRAP was introduced with the explicit aim of making employment ﬁ-
nancially more attractive, especially to youngsters and women, and - at the
same time - redistributing income in an eﬀort to reduce the poverty risk of less
productive workers14. Most remarkable are the words of the Finance Minister
himself:
“The idea behind the earned income tax credit is that the organization of
solidarity must go beyond the simple passive compensation for people out of
employment and extend to low-paid workers. Such an instrument aims at both
promoting employment and ﬁghting poverty. Below a certain income threshold,
the tax credit becomes a complementary income transfer. It is therefore similar
to other negative tax systems, such as the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC),
implemented in Great Britain by the Blair Government” (Reynders, 2001, p.7)
— [translated from French].
In fact, the Belgian CIBRAP turns out to be very diﬀerent from the WFTC
and the EITC, and is more similar to the Dutch arbeidskorting introduced in
2001. Like the latter, the CIBRAP is fully individualized and not means-tested,
but, similarly to the Anglo-Saxon measures, it is refundable. Individualization of
the beneﬁt implies - for example - that both members of a couple are potentially
eligible and more importantly - the income of one partner has no eﬀect on
the eligibility of the other. The main drawback of the family based IWBs is
therefore avoided. On the other hand, the broad eligibility conditions imply
that the amount of the beneﬁti sm u c hl o w e rt h a nt h eW F T C .A l s o ,d i ﬀerently
from the WFTC and the PPE, the CIBRAP is not scaled according to family
conditions, so that the number of dependants is not taken into account. Such a
feature may cause the beneﬁtt ob eq u i t ei n e ﬀective in tackling inactivity traps,
as means-tested beneﬁts like the MINIMEX are scaled on household size. The
net replacement rate of inactivity by employment will therefore be higher for
single women on social assistance than for single mothers.
Other characteristics of the new IWB closely match the characteristics of
the instruments that already exist in other countries: the beneﬁt is phased-in
and phased-out with a relatively low taper, it is conditional on working at least
13 hours and it is administered by the ﬁscal authorities.
Fig. 3 shows the structure and the progressive implementation of the tax
credit. Eligibility starts when net earned income (i.e. gross earned income net of
SSCs and professional expenses) is above C =3,750. Between this lower threshold
and C =5,000 the beneﬁt will be phased in very sharply at a rate of 40.5% (i.e. the












Figure 3: CIBRAP-Crédit d’Impôt sur les Bas Revenus d’Activité Profession-
nelle
beneﬁti n c r e a s e sb yC =40.5 for every C =100 earned between C =3,750 and C =5,000).
Between C =5,000 and C =12,530 EUR the beneﬁt amounts to C =506 and between
C =12,530 and C =16,280 the beneﬁt is phased out at a rate of 13.5%, meaning that
C =13.5 of beneﬁt are lost for every additional C =100 earned. In 2003 (respectively
2004), the phase-in rate will be 7.2% (20%) and the phase-out rate will be 2.4%
(6.7%) while the maximum amount of the beneﬁt will be C =90 (C =253).
The CIBRAP applies to both the employees and the self-employed, but its
total amount is limited to the fraction of professional income (i.e. employment
and self-employment incomes) in total earned income (which also includes re-
placement incomes).
The working tax credit is a measure that will mostly beneﬁth o u s e h o l d s
in the lower part of the income distribution, although the lack of a targeting
framework (like means-testing on household income) implies that a substantial
share of entitled individuals might be found in the upper middle part of the
income distribution.
4.0.2 Increasing deductions for work expenses
According to Belgian tax law, deductions for work expenses are computed using
a progressive earning brackets system. The tax reform will increase deductions
for low salaries by increasing the deduction rate in the ﬁrst income bracket.
Fig. 4 shows the progressive increase of the deduction rate in the ﬁrst bracket.
Earnings in the range between 0 and C =4,320 will beneﬁt from an additional
deduction of 5% in 2005 (as a transitory measure the additional deduction will
be 3% in 2003 and 2004).
The increase in the deductions for work expenses deduction is a measure
192001 2003 2005
0 - 4,320 20% 23% 25%
4,320 - 8,580 10% 10% 10%
8,580 - 14,280 5% 5% 5%
more than 14,280 3% 3% 3%
Source: Ministère des Finances (2002b) 
Gross earnings
Marginal rate of deduction
Figure 4: Increased deductions for work expenses
Marginal tax rate
25% 0 - 6,570 0 - 6,570 0 - 6,570
30% 6,570 - 8,710 6,570 - 9,350 6,570 9,350
40% 8,710 - 12,420 9,350 - 13,950 9,350 15,580
45% 12,420 - 28,540 13,950 - 28,540 15,580 28,540
Source: Ministère des Finances (2002b) 
2005 2003 2001
Income brackets
Figure 5: Broader central tax brackets
which will beneﬁt all taxpayers, yet its impact on household disposable income
is not likely to be very signiﬁcant. Very low earnings, in fact, are already
almost completely exempt due to the combined eﬀects of the basic personal tax
deduction and - now - the CIBRAP. For medium and higher earnings, on the
other hand, the increase in the total deduction is quite marginal.
4.0.3 Broadening of the central tax brackets
Although the overall inﬂation level was signiﬁcantly lower than in previous
decades, the suspension of indexation of tax brackets during the 90s increased
the overall progressivity of the tax system. The ﬁscal drag resulted in an in-
creased tax burden even on low and medium incomes. The improvement of
the main macroeconomic indicators has allowed for the reintroduction of a full
indexation of the tax brackets starting from tax year 2001. Moreover, the tax
reform will stepwise reshape progressivity in the middle tax brackets by broad-
ening the middle-lower brackets and narrowing the middle-upper brackets.
Fig. ?? shows how the 30 and 40% marginal tax rate brackets will pro-
gressively be expanded at the expense of the 45% tax bracket. The reform will
concentrate on the middle to lower part of the distribution in the ﬁrst phase,
and it will be extended to higher earnings in 2005. The broadening of the central
tax bracket is the most expensive measure of the tax reform as it substantially
increases the disposable income of a wide range of taxpayers (83% of taxpayers
according to Reynders, 2001), with more substantial increases concentrated in
the middle of the distribution.
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28,540 - 42,810 50% 50% 50%
42,810 - 62,790 52.5% 52% 50%
more than 62,790 55% 52% 50%
Source: Ministère des Finances (2002b) 
Income brackets
Marginal tax rates
Figure 6: Collapsing highest marginal tax brackets
4.0.4 Abolition of the highest marginal tax rates
The fourth measure in the ﬁrst pillar is clearly targeted at higher incomes: the
two highest marginal tax rate brackets (55 and 52.5% respectively) are collapsed
and - in a second step - merged with the third highest tax bracket. As shown
in ﬁg. 6, the highest marginal tax rate will drop to 50%. This corresponds to a
drop of 5% in the highest bracket and of 2.5% in the second highest bracket.
4.0.5 Alignment of tax exempt basic personal allowance for couples
and singles
The last measure that will be considered, and that is likely to have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on female labour supply choices, is the alignment of tax exempt basic
personal allowance of singles and married couples. The basic personal tax de-
duction for married couples increases in two steps from C =4,350 to C =4,540 and in
2005 from C =4,540 to C =5,480. This measure implies increased tax deductions by
almost 25%, although the beneﬁts are likely to be concentrated on households
in the middle of the distribution. The personal tax deduction is in fact not
refundable, so only households whose pre-deduction tax liability is higher than
the full amount of the credit will fully beneﬁt from the new measure.
4.1 The impact of the reform: costs and beneﬁts
Fig. 7 summarizes the timetable for the implementation of all the measures of
the reform (i.e. all 4 pillars). In the present study we have focused only on the
ﬁrst 5 measures (i.e. pillar 1 and part of pillar 2). As previously mentioned these
measures represent the core of the new tax reform (as they absorb around 85% of
the estimated budgetary cost). The choice to focus on these measures, however,
has also been pragmatic as they could more readily be integrated into the tax-
beneﬁt simulation model Modété (for more information see the appendix). In
our analysis we do not model the transitory measures, but instead we simulate
the ﬁnal eﬀects of the reform, had it been instantaneously implemented in 2001.
Fig. 8 compares the oﬃcial estimated budgetary cost of the tax reform
and the estimates produced by our tax beneﬁt model. Results are indeed very
similar, which conﬁrms the validity of our simulation model. Estimations in
212002 2003 2004 2005
Reduction in the tax burden on labour ppf
  CIBRAP p ff
  Increase in the deductions for working expenses p f
  Broadening of the central tax brackets p ff
  Abolition of highest marginal tax rates
Neutrality with respect to lifestyle choices
  Alignment of the tax exempt income quotas p f
  Individualisation of tax reductions for replacement incomes f
  Generalisation of separate taxation to unarned income f
Improvement in the way that dependent children are taen into account
  Making tax reduction refundable fff
  Increase in the single parent means-test limit ffff
  Generalisation of tax exempt for all single parents with dependent children fff
More environmentally sound taxation
  Deduction for non-car transport costs ffff
  Energy saving deductions ff
p= partial implementation f=full implementation
Source: Valenduc (2002)





Millions of Euros Millions of Euros %
Increased deductions for working expenses 312 248 125.7%
Broadening of the central tax brackets 872 768 113.5%
Abolition of highest marginal tax rates 469 174 270.5%
CIBRAP 384 446 86.0%
Alignment of the tax exempt income quotas 1,135 1,091 104.1%
Overall effect
† 3,168 2,727 116.18%
Source: Author's calculations using Modété, Reynders (2001)
† Overall effect may differ from sum of components due to interactions between instruments
Figure 8: Estimated budgetary costs of the tax reform (2001 values)
Reynders (2001) are based on a database of tax-ﬁles and the microsimulation
model SIRe. Part of the discrepancies is due to the fact that tax ﬁles data usually
report signiﬁcantly lower incomes than data from income surveys. Moreover, our
estimates are based on 1998 microdata (monetary variables have been inﬂated to
2001). The single most signiﬁcant discrepancy is represented by the estimated
cost of the reduction of the highest marginal tax rates. On the one hand, it
is well-known that tax ﬁles underreport sources of income that are partially
captured in income distribution surveys and on the other hand, households in
the middle to upper part of the income distribution are usually able to deduct
signiﬁcant expenses (pension savings, health care, investments) which are not
simulated by the tax beneﬁt model. Yet the size of the discrepancy is larger
than expected and would justify further research.
As stated in the introduction, the budgetary cost of the reform will imply a
22Millions 
Euros
% of 2001 GDP Source
Generalized reduction of tax burden
Netherlands 7,000 1.648 Ministerie van Financiën (2000)
Germany 32,000 1.551 Bundesfinanzministerium (2003)
Italy  (lower boundary) 20,000 1.644 Baldini and Bosi (2002)
(upper boundary) 45,000 3.699 Baldini and Bosi (2002)
Belgium (net of CIBRAP) 2,280 0.889 Reynders (2001)
2,784 1.085 Own estimates
In work benefits
France PPE 2,102 0.144 Legendre et al. (2002)
UK WFTC 8,465 0.532 Inland Revenue (2001)
Belgium CIBRAP 446 0.174 Reynders (2001)
384 0.150 Own estimates
Figure 9: Tax and beneﬁt reforms in Europe: a comparison
loss of tax revenue of around 10% (the progressive implementation of the reform
is nevertheless likely to reduce this cost). This corresponds to about 1-1,15% of
the 2001 GDP.
The most expensive measure is - as could easily be predicted - the increase
in the exempted quota for married couples (around 35% of the total budget).
The second most expensive measure is the broadening of the central tax brack-
ets. Again this is not surprising, as the eﬀect of this measure is expected to
cover more than 80% of all taxpayers. According to oﬃcial estimations the re-
fundable tax credit will be the third most important measure, but according to
own estimations it comes fourth only. The underestimation of the cost of the
CIBRAP is, again, probably due to the diﬀerent databases used. Tax ﬁles are
likely to underestimate earnings thus inﬂating the number of eligible earners.
Also, as shown in ﬁg. 1, the employment rate of the low skilled has signiﬁcantly
increased between 1998 and 2000, due to favourable macroeconomic conditions.
Fig. 9 compares the budgetary cost of the reforms in Belgium and in refer-
ence countries, using a variety of sources. The cost of the reform is comparable
to that of recent reforms implemented in other European countries. The gener-
alized reduction of taxes is somewhat lower in Belgium than in the Netherlands
and in Germany (and than forecasted for Italy). Yet, it must be noted that
signiﬁcant reforms in the reduction of employees’ and employers’ social security
contributions had already been implemented in previous years. With respect
to in-work beneﬁts, the Belgian reform appears to be much more in line with
the French beneﬁt than with the UK beneﬁt. These results should be kept in
mind when assessing the relative eﬃciency of the reform in an international
perspective.
A fully static analysis of the gains from the Belgian tax reform is beyond
the scope of the present paper which concentrates on behavioral responses. For
a detailed static analysis on the equity and the eﬃciency of the reform, see
Valenduc (2002). In the present section we simply concentrate on some mea-
sures of the impact of the reform on household disposable income, in order to
23Income 
decile Modété SIRe Modété SIRe Modété SIRe
1 19.37 66.93 44.63 391.75 0.61 2.00
2 71.39 135.85 165.39 388.57 2.25 4.10
3 139.81 145.27 323.19 360.78 4.42 4.40
4 214.18 182.20 493.00 426.72 6.76 5.50
5 264.75 233.52 614.45 526.53 8.36 7.10
6 345.07 311.35 795.29 685.60 10.90 9.90
7 356.97 409.52 826.78 897.50 11.27 12.40
8 416.46 502.73 962.12 1094.45 13.15 15.20
9 446.21 573.38 1032.21 1245.07 14.09 17.40
10 892.42 738.47 2063.58 1605.01 28.18 22.40
All 3166.62 3299.21 731.88 807.90 100.00 100.00
Source: Author's calculations and Valenduc (2002)
% of total gain
Average gain 
(EUR/year)
Total gain (billions 
EUR)
Figure 10: Distribution of the gains from the reform by income decile (total and
average amounts)
clearly distinguish between ﬁrst-round static eﬀects and second-round eﬀects
that consider the gains induced by potential behavioral responses.
Fig. 10 shows the distribution of total and average gains over the range of the
income distribution. The ﬁgures are compared with those obtained by Valenduc
(2002) using the Ministry of ﬁnance microsimulation software SIRe. Overall, the
oﬃcial statistics seem to be conﬁrmed by the results drawn from Modété. The
discrepancies are due to the fact that (a) Valenduc (2002) considers all four
axes of the reform and (b) the SIRe microsimulation concerns only a sample of
taxpayers, whereas our data set contains information on the whole population,
including the inactive part. This explains why most diﬀerences are concentrated
in lower income deciles.
Fig. 11 shows the distribution of the gains from the reform in terms of the
percentage increase in household disposable income. As in the previous ﬁgure,
household income is adjusted to account for household size using an equivalence
scale corresponding to the squared root of household size. The reform is clearly
a reform for the middle class mainly, with most substantial gains concentrated
in the upper income deciles. It is important to notice, however, that the reform
dominates in Pareto terms the pre-reform baseline, as no household is made
worse oﬀ by the reform15. Average eﬀective tax rates either remain unchanged
or decrease for the whole population.
Finally, we will consider some distributional indicators (ﬁg. 12). The post-
15The above statement obviously does not take into account the eﬀects of lost tax revenue
or the decrease in social expenditures needed to meet the cost of the reform.
24decile [0-1%] [1%-2.5%] [2.5-5%] [5-7.5%] [>7.5%]
1 79.3% 1.9% 12.1% 5.3% 1.4%
2 46.7% 15.5% 26.9% 7.1% 3.7%
3 15.2% 23.8% 47.0% 12.4% 1.5%
4 8.6% 29.5% 44.0% 17.5% 0.4%
5 4.8% 23.7% 59.9% 11.1% 0.5%
6 4.4% 23.8% 64.9% 6.8% 0.0%
7 5.1% 25.0% 66.1% 3.8% 0.0%
8 4.0% 27.2% 68.3% 0.6% 0.0%
91 . 4 % 47.5% 51.0% 0.2% 0.0%
10 4.3% 42.9% 46.1% 4.8% 1.9%
Source: Author's calculations
Percentage increase in disposable income
Figure 11: Distribution of the gains from the reform by income decile
Before reform After reform
Poverty
 50% of median disposable income 9.39 8.87
 60% of median disposable income 15.66 14.98
Inequality
 Gini 0.2764 0.2772
Source: Author's calculations
Figure 12: Pre- and post-reform inequality and poverty indicators
reform poverty remains at the pre-reform level. Household disposable income
is adjusted using the squared root of household size as an equivalence scale.
Poverty rates estimated using Modété are broadly in line with estimates based
on the ECHP and other data sets16.
Poverty rates (head count ratios) decrease by about .7 percentage points if
we refer to the 60% baseline and by around .5 if we consider the 50% baseline.
On the other hand, inequality increases as witnesed by the increase in the Gini
index.
Fig. 13 and ﬁg. 14 show the impact of the reform on a single-earner and two-
earner household working at the minimum wage (with two children). The upper
dotted line shows total disposable income after the reform, while the lower solid
line shows disposable income before the reform. The two ﬁgures are informative
with respect to the potential gains of working before and after the reform,
although they refer to hypothetical household structures. It is evident that the













Figure 13: Budget constraint for a single earner household (earnings increasing
from 0 to 200% of minimum wage) with two children (EUR/year)
reform has no impact whatsoever on the ﬁrst segment of the budget curve. This
is also pointed out in Valenduc (2002), according to whom the reform has not
tackled poverty traps where these are most insidious17. This analysis, however,
must be reﬁned. The analysis of incentives to take up work cannot be limited
to ex-ante and ex-post comparison of hypothetical household typologies, but
must be evaluated with respect to the actual distribution of household income
and characteristics. We now turn to the analysis of the impact of the reform on
labour supply. Before introducing the main result, the following section details
the econometric model.
4.2 A discrete hours labour supply model
In the following section we will explore in further detail the methodology behind
the discrete hours labour supply approach which will eventually be used to
estimate labour supply responses to the 2001 Belgian tax reform. The estimation
methodology requires three components:
1) a suﬃciently large sample of households with suﬃcient information on
demographic variables, income and labour market status;
2) a microsimulation model, i.e. a series of algorithms capable of replicating
the budget constraint faced by workers before and after the 2001 tax reform;
17"The improvements in ﬁnancial incentives to take up work appear much more dispersed
than the inactivity traps and the most signiﬁcant eﬀects, both in terms of increased disposable
income and decreased marginal eﬀective tax rates are not concentrated where inactivity traps

















Figure 14: Budget constraint for a two-earner household (one partner with ﬁxed
earnings at 100% minimum wage, the other with increasing earnings from 0 to
200% of minimum wage) with two children (EUR/year)
3) a behavioral model capable of explaining observed labour supply and
predict changes brought about by shocks to the budget constraint.
These components will be analysed in detail in the following sections.
4.2.1 Data: The Panel Survey of Belgian Households (PSBH)
Belgium does not have a history of high-quality data collection. Few micro data
sets are available and most are quite limited in size and scope. In 1989 the Uni-
versities of Liège and of Antwerp were charged by the Federal ScientiﬁcR e s e a r c h
Oﬃce (SSTC/DWTC) to undertake a systematic collection of relevant social,
economic and demographic information on a panel of households representa-
tive of the country. The ﬁrst round of interviews started in 1992 and included
information on current as well as previous year’s incomes and labour market
conditions. Recently the 10th wave of the panel has been made available.
Although the panel ﬁlls an important gap (the PSBH data are also used in
the European Community Household Panel — ECHP), it is relatively small in
size compared to other countries. At the start of the project 4,438 households
and approximately 10,000 people (adults and children) were interviewed, and by
the 8th wave — the one used for this study — attrition had reduced the number
of households to 3,773 and the number of people to 9,262. The data set has
been weighted using the GROSS programme developed by Johanna Gomulka in
Cambridge (Gomulka, 1992). Several controls where used to weight the data:
demographic structure, regional population and labour force status.
27Women Men
Working time (hours/week)/pop. in employment 31.7 42.0
Working time (hours/week)/total pop.  23.3 39.1
Gross wage rate (EUR/hour)/ pop. in employment 11.1 13.0
Gross wage rate (EUR/hour)/potentially active population  11.0 -
Age 40.18 41.94
Primary education 7.31% 6.59%
Secondary education 54.25% 54.61%
Tertiary education 38.45% 38.80%
# of children 
Presence of a child 0-3
Presence of a child 3-6
Selected sample of households
Corresponding population
 # of households








Figure 15: Subsample used for LS estimates - descriptive statistics
The estimation of the labour supply model was restricted to couples with
both the household head and the spouse aged between 25 and 60, i.e. the active
and potentially active population. Self-employed workers were excluded from
the selection (due to unreliable information about hours worked and income),
as well as people not likely to modify their labour supply: pensioners, students
and the disabled. The unemployed were also excluded from the sample. Since
the latter are supposed to be constrained from labour demand, no incentive is
assumed to have a potential eﬀect on their labour market status. In order to
increase the homogeneity of the sample, we excluded three generation house-
holds and households with more than three children, the latter being deﬁned as
persons under the age of 18 or 25 when in full-time education. Finally, house-
holds with signiﬁcant additional self-employment income (more than C =500 per
month) where also excluded.
After the selection process, the database contained 1,259 couples. Fig. 15
reports descriptive statistics for the estimation sub-sample. Estimated female
gross wage is also reported in the table. Estimation procedure and results are
reported in the appendix.
4.2.2 Microsimulation software: Modété
A microsimulation software is a series of algorithms that allow to simulate the
tax and beneﬁts in a certain country at a given time. Typically, tax and beneﬁt
legislation is translated into parameters read by the algorithms. The software
runs on an input database containing relevant information to determine eligibil-
28ity and liability conditions, as well as the amount of beneﬁts to be awarded and
the extent of the liability. Modété is a microsimulation software developed by
Dulbéa-ETE in the framework of the EU project EUROMOD. It runs on PSBH
data and it allows to simulate income assistance, child beneﬁts, taxes and social
security contributions. Pensions and unemployment beneﬁts are not simulated
as the PSBH does not collect all necessary information on past employment
records. Yet, this is not a major problem for the present study as we focus only
on potentially active people18.
4.2.3 The Labour Supply model
Following most recent studies on labour supply eﬀects of tax and welfare sys-
tem reforms, labor supply modelling in this paper relies on a discrete choice
multinomial/conditional logit model and on a traditional speciﬁcation in terms
of consumption-leisure preferences19. If a household i is oﬀered to choose one
among J work durations for the female adult, it is assumed that the utility the
household V may derive from alternative j (=1 ,..J)i sg i v e nb y :
Vij = U(Hj,C ij − fij,Z i)+ ij,
where U() is a conventional utility function which depends on female work
duration (Hj) and consumption (Cij)a sw e l la so nav e c t o rZi of household
characteristics. Note that in this static framework all income is assumed to be
transformed in consumption. Following the bulk of the literature, labour sup-
ply of men is supposed to be constant whereas women are assumed to choose
between non-participation (H1 =0 ), part-time (H2 =2 0hours/week) and
full-time (H3 =4 0hours per week). This discrete approach is particularly ap-
propriate when institutional and demand-side rigidities are strong and imply
concentration around a limited number of hours choices (see Van Soest, 1995).
Although the distribution of working hours is indeed continuous, the high den-
sities around these three peaks justify such a discrete approach (see appendix
for more details on working hours).
Following Blundell et al. (2000) we also allow for ﬁxed costs of labour supply.
These are fully integrated into the model. Fixed costs are modelled as the sum of
a ﬁxed term and a variable term which depends on household characteristics and
the labour supply choice. It should be noted that we have no information about
ﬁxed costs which are treated as latent unobservable variables. Also note that
ﬁxed costs capture various eﬀects that may have an impact on labour supply
decisions: child care costs, commuting costs, job search activity and distaste for
labour20.
18For more information on Modété, see the appendix.
19See Van Soest (1995), Keane and Moﬃt (1998) and Hoynes (1996), Blundell et al. (2000),
Van Soest and Das (2000), Bonin, Kempe and Schneider (2002), Bargain (2003) and Haan
and Steiner (2004).
20See Das and Van Soest (2000).
29The actual utility derived from alternative j for household i, Vij, also includes
an error term  ij that is assumed to be identically and independently distributed
across alternatives and households according to a type I-extreme value (Weibull)
distribution. Under this distributional assumption, McFadden (1973) proves
that the probability P that alternative k is chosen by household i is given by:
Pik =P r ( Vik ≥ Vij,∀j =1 ,..J)=
expU(Hk,C ik − fik,Z i)
PJ
j=1 expU(Hj,C ij − fij,Z i)
.
The likelihood of a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expres-
sion as a function of the preference parameters of function U(). Estimates of
these parameters may be obtained by maximum likelihood techniques. As in
Blundell et al. (2000), we choose a quadratic functional form so that, for choice
j =1 ,...J, the deterministic part of the utility is written as follows:
Uij = αch(Cij − fij)Hj + αci(Cij − fij)+αhiHj + αcc(Cij − fij)2 + αhhHj
2,
with heterogeneity:
αci = αc + α(age)+β(age2)




f(# of children ≤ 3) + β
h
f(# of children ≤ 6),h =2 0 ,40
Fixed costs are assumed to be diﬀerent when working full-time or part time,








was maximized with the econometric software STATA, version 8.0.
Regularity conditions were checked ex-post rather than being imposed in
the maximization process. In particular, C-monotonicity and quasi-concavity
are natural minimum requirements for positive and normative analysis of tax
reforms. Positive monotonicity is written as:
∂Uij
∂Cij
=2 αcc(Cij − Fij)+αchHj + αcir > 0





=2 αcc ≤ 0
Both conditions were checked a posteriori, thus avoiding the MaCurdy cri-
tique (MaCurdy, 1992) that elasticities are largely determined ap r i o r i .
30For workers with observed wages, gross income across diﬀerent labour sup-
ply alternatives was computed assuming a constant hourly wage rate21.S i n c e
potential hourly wages for inactive females are not observable, these were es-
timated using a standard Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman, 1979). The
wage equation was estimated using human capital variables and the selection
bias was accounted for through a vector of household and individual character-
istics. The identiﬁcation of the model is secured by controlling for at least one
diﬀerent covariate in the selection model. The results of the wage estimations
are presented in the appendix.
Once real and predicted hourly wages have been obtained for all adult fe-
males in the sample, we construct household gross income related to the three
alternatives and, using the microsimulation model, the set of net incomes cor-
responding to the three labour market statuses.
4.2.4 Structural model of labour supply: some drawbacks
The recent widespread use of discrete labour supply models proves their suitabil-
ity to a priori evaluate the behavioural impact of shocks in the budget constraint
driven by reforms in the tax and beneﬁt system. Yet this approach suﬀers from
several drawbacks which must be kept inm i n dw h e ni n t e r p r e t i n gt h er e s u l t s .
First, such models are totally supply-driven; very few studies include demand-
side constraints. A reform’s impact on employment rates might be substantially
overestimated if the extra potential labour oﬀer is constrained by an insuﬃcient
labour demand. To our knowledge, Boeters et al. (2004) is the only study
that includes discrete labour supply in the framework of a general equilibrium
model22. However, the authors conclude that provided that labour supply ef-
fects are not substantial, a pure supply-side framework still provides reasonable
results. In a general equilibrium model with endogenous wage formation, tax
and beneﬁt reforms could indeed bring about variations in gross wage as well
as a balanced increase in labour demand and supply which would automatically
aﬀect the unemployed as well as the inactive population.
Moreover, the utilitarian framework used is completely static: disposable
income corresponds to total consumption and all life cycle considerations are
excluded. It is well-known that in a life cycle perspective, labour supply re-
sponses to permanent shocks are rather limited (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999),
so that our static framework might overestimate labour supply responsiveness.
Finally, the present study adopts a unitary utility function23.M o r e o v e r ,
we assume a “male chauvinist„ labour supply model, where the male partner
makes his labour supply choice and the female partner maximizes household
utility subject to the labour supply strategy of the male. Although such an
21This assumption is standard in most recent labour supply litterature, although there are
some exeptions, such as Moﬃt (1984) and Tummers and Woittiez (1991).
22An alternative to the complex CGE approach is the framework proposed in the aforemen-
tioned study by Aaberge et al. (1997).
23In a unitary framework it is assumed that household members pool their resources and
choose amongst alternative strategies in order to maximize a common household utility func-
tion.
31approach is more than justiﬁable on sociological as well as empirical observa-
tions, it is increasingly being questioned by economic theory, which argues that
unitary models are not compatible with the individualism that is at the heart of
microeconomic theory. Beninger et al. (2003) have extended the above labour
supply model to joint labour supply decisions and intra household welfare allo-
cation, within a collective setting. In applied microeconomic analysis, there is
still no consensus as regards bargaining models of labour supply in a collective
setting.
5M a i n R e s u l t s
Parameter estimates for the behavioural model are shown in ﬁg. 16. The
results are in line with theoretical predictions and recent empirical ﬁndings.
The coeﬃcients of income and squared female hours are negative, indicating
the marginally decreasing utility of consumption and leisure. Together with the
interaction terms, these coeﬃcients determine the elasticity of labour supply.
The taste for labour decreases (more than proportionally) with women’s age.
Preference for labour also decreases with the number of children and when
education level is low. On the contrary, the taste for consumption depends
positively on age and age squared. Fixed costs of labour supply are higher than
expected: 57,000 BEF i.e. approximately the level of the full-time minimum
wage in 2001. Yet, this result is only partially surprising: on the one hand, ﬁxed
costs of labour supply measure distaste for work for several diﬀerent reasons
(Das and Van Soest, 2000), on the other, it is possible that some women would
prefer to work a diﬀerent amount of hours, but are constrained by institutional
rigidities (Bourgignon and Magnac, 1990)24.N o t e ,ﬁnally, that the variable part
of the costs of labour supply appears to ha v er e a s o n a b l ev a l u e s :t h ep r e s e n c eo f
children under the age of three is signiﬁcant when working part-time and full-
time and the associated costs when working full-time are around 20,000 BEF,
i.e. the average price of a full-time month in day care. Older children do not
have a signiﬁcant impact on the cost of labour supply.
Overall, the ﬁt of the model was relatively good. Fig. 17 shows the number
and percentage of correctly predicted cases, a classical measure of the goodness
of ﬁt. Slightly more than 50% of the cases appears to be correctly placed. Few
studies report such a measure of goodness of ﬁt. Compared to Bargain (2003),
who also focuses on descrete choices of feamels in couples, our model performs
relatively well, especially concerning the prediction of part-time, which is usually
underestimated25.
24Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) obtain extremely high ﬁxed costs of labour supply for
France: around 2.5 times average earnings.
Based on a british sample, Blundell et al (2000) obtain more reasonble estimates (around
C =300 per month. Bargain (2003) obtains estimates of around C =600 for 1998.
25Underestimation of part-time is usually explained through institutional rigidities and
labour demand constraints (Van Soest, 1995). The better ﬁt produced by our model could
be interpreted as a sign that part-time work in Belgium is more related to actual preferences
than to demand-side constraints.
32Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
Income / 10000
(age of female - 40)/10 0.082263 0.035376 2.33 0.020 0.012927 0.151599
((age of female - 40)/10)
2 0.091739 0.028047 3.27 0.001 0.036768 0.14671
constant 0.275115 0.074645 3.69 0.000 0.128813 0.421417
Female hours 
(age of female - 40)/10 -1.00529 0.190871 -5.27 0.000 -1.37939 -0.63119
((age of female - 40)/10)
2 -0.13524 0.198641 -0.68 0.496 -0.52457 0.254092
Female has low education -0.42563 0.158465 -2.69 0.007 -0.73621 -0.11504
# of children -0.4429 0.09222 -4.8 0.000 -0.62364 -0.26215
constant 5.486056 1.874646 2.93 0.003 1.811816 9.160295
(Income / 10000)
2
constant -0.00364 0.001093 -3.34 0.001 -0.00579 -0.0015
Female hours
2
constant -3.83683 1.329043 -2.89 0.004 -6.4417 -1.23195
Female hours x income
constant 0.00733 0.023073 0.32 0.751 -0.03789 0.052552
Fixed cost of labour supply / 10000
constant 5.726184 1.935859 2.96 0.003 1.931969 9.520399
Variable costs of labour supply (part time)
# children 0-3 1.443501 0.864267 1.67 0.095 -0.25043 3.137432
# children 3-6 0.045997 0.779548 0.06 0.953 -1.48189 1.573884
Variable costs of labour supply (full time)
# children 0-3 1.951273 0.893286 2.18 0.029 0.200465 3.70208
# children 3-6 1.407677 0.968496 1.45 0.146 -0.49054 3.305895
Log likelihood -1235
Number of observations 1259
Source: author's calculations
[95% Conf. Interval]
Figure 16: Discrete model of female labour supply - estimation results
Predictions
Inactive Part-time Full-time Total
Inactive 141 117 75 333
% 0.42 0.35 0.23
Part-time 46 157 170 373
% 0.12 0.42 0.46
Full-time 63 162 328 553
% 0.11 0.29 0.59
Total 250 436 573 1,259
Source: author's calculations










Figure 18: Predicted probabilities and observed frequencies
Finally, several studies26 present, as a measure of goodness of ﬁt, a compar-
ison of observed frequencies and of the averages of predicted probabilities27.A s
shown by ﬁg. 18 the model performs very well with respect to this measure as
well.
5.0.5 Model calibration
Once preference parameters have been estimated, they may be used to predict
post reform labour supply behaviour. A common strategy to analyze labour
supply responses is to calibrate the labour supply model in the baseline scenario,
before analysing the impact of the reform. In order to produce a 100% ﬁto ft h e
observed data we have drawn a set of unobserved random terms which may be
interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity. Triplets of random heterogeneity terms
(one for each discrete choice) were drawn from a type I-extreme value (Weibull)
distribution until the sum estimated deterministic utility and the stochastic
heterogeneity component yielded the observed choice for each household in the
sample. This procedure was repeated 200 times in order to interpret post-reform
behavioral responses in probabilistic terms rather than in deterministic terms.
For more details on the calibration procedure, see Creedy and Duncan (2002)
or Creedy and Kalb (2003).
5.0.6 Labour supply elasticities
Potential behavioural responses to an external shock to the budget constraint
d e p e n do nt h es i z eo ft h es h o c ka n do nt h es ize of elasticities. In many studies,
elasticities are evaluated at the sample mean or for a representative household.
As pointed out by Van Soest and Das (2000), this is not very informative - in a
highly nonlinear model like ours - as regards the consequence of wage changes in
26See, for example, Van Soest (1995) and Bonin, Kempe and Schneider (2002).
27Note the diﬀerence between the predicted frequencies and the average of predicted fre-
quencies: in the ﬁrst case the prediction for each individual simply corresponds to the choice
which maximizes utility amongst possible alternatives; in the second case we compute indi-
vidual probabilities for each individual, deﬁned as the ratio of the utility in each status over





Figure 19: Female labour supply gross wage elasticity
a heterogeneous population. Instead, wage-elasticities can be computed numer-
ically (following an increase of 10% of gross wage), and averaged over the whole
sample28. Fig.19 shows estimated labour supply elasticities for the selected sam-
ple of women in couples. We are not aware of recent studies on female labour
supply elasticity for Belgium that use a similar methodology. The results are
nevertheless in line with recent international empirical ﬁndings: elasticity ap-
pears to be relatively small and mostly driven by changes in the participation
rate rather than by changes at the extensive margin. Conﬁdence intervals were
computed by bootstrapping 1000 times from the asymptotic distribution of the
labour supply model’s parameter estimates and averaging responses over the
whole sample. Compared to other studies, the size of the bootstrap conﬁdence
interval is much larger, probably owing to the limited sample size. It is inter-
esting to note, however, that both the lower and upper bound of the conﬁdence
interval are within the range of estimates provided in other recent empirical
analyses.
For the sake of comparison, ﬁg. 20 shows recent estimates of labour supply
elasticities for females in couples. Unfortunately, not all studies on impact of
tax and beneﬁt reforms previously cited report estimations of labour supply
elasticities. We have therefore exploited all sources available in order to provide
a picture of the range of variation of elasticity estimates in the selected countries.
The somewhat higher estimations encountered for the Netherlands are probably
due to a greater variation in working hours, and a high share of very short part-
time. Female employment on the other hand is known to be higher in the
UK than in most other countries in contninental Europe, which explains the
somewhat lower elasticities. Hence, like in the case of France and Germany,
Belgian estimates appear to be contained between the Dutch and the British
estimates29.
28To do so, we increase female wage rates uniformly by 10% and simulate the corresponding
disposable incomes. Preference parameters are hence used to obtain the deterministic utility
associated to the three alternatives. We then add to the deterministic utility, the pseudo-
residual we have been drawing to calibrate the model, and predict, for each draw, the new
preferred labour market status. The probabilities associated to each status are then averaged
over the whole sample and compared to the baseline.
29It should be noted that Blundell et al. (1995) use a diﬀerent methodology for their
estimates, namely a natural experiment. Choné, Le Blanc and Robert-Bobée (2003) focus on
a sub-sample of mothers with young children. The diﬀerence in the sample is likely to explain








Standard discrete hours LS 
model (quadratic utility)
0.20 0.18 -
Flexible LS model with income 




LFS-Tax return matched dataset, 1997. Couples 
with children under the age of 6: 2,363 in 
employment and 2,012 non-employed
Simultaneous model of discrete 




German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2000. 
Labour supply estimates based on 3,702 couples 
(1,112 females in employment) 
Simultaneous discrete hours LS 




German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP), 2002. 
Labour supply estimates based on 7,494 
households
Simultaneous discrete hours LS 




Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), 1987. 1,421 
in employment and 1,438 non employed
Simultaneous discrete hours LS 
model for males and females 
(translog utility)
0.52 -
Change in hours mostly driven by 
change in participation
The Netherlands
Dutch Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), 1995. 1,150 
in employment and 919 non employed
Simultaneous discrete hours LS 
model for males and females 
(translog utility)
0.71 -
Change in hours mostly driven by 
change in participation
Italy
Turin Survey of Couples, 1979. 338 employed 
and 494 non employed




Bank of Italy Survey of Income and Wealth, 1993. 
2160 couples aged betwen 18-64
Continuous distribution of 
working hours
0.66 0.51 -
0.29 - Pre-school children
0.71 - School children
UK
British General Household Survey, 1974. 2,002 in 
mployment and 1,494 non-employed
Continuous LS (piecewise linear 
budget constraint)
2.03 1.41
0.21 - Young children
0.14 - No children 
France
French Household Budget Survey (EBF), 1994. 
2,744 in employment and 860 non-employed
British Family Expenditure Survey (FES) and 




Continuous LS (piecewise linear 
budget constraint)
Conditional difference in differenc
Lfamily Expenditure Survey (FES), 1978-1992. 
16,781 in employment and 7,845 non-employed
Figure 20: Recent labour supply elasticity estimates (females in couples)
36predictions
inactivity part time full-time
inactivity 26.318 0.754 0.965
part-time 0.011 33.479 0.257
full-time 0.031 0.066 38.120
Source: Author's calculations
Figure 21: Pre and Post-reform transition matrix (percentage points)
5.0.7 Labour supply responses
Low elasticities of labour supply sugest a modest eﬀect of the reform on female
labour supply. Indeed, ﬁg. 21 shows the matrix of transitions following the
reform. These have been computed using the same methodology as for the
elasticities. Following the reform, about 1% of selected women are likely to
move into full-time employment, and a modest share is likely to move into part-
time employment (+0.75%). Moreover, about one quarter of a percentage point
will move from part-time employment to full-time employment. There appear to
be very few movements out of employment: the net eﬀect is therefore an increase
in the female employment rate. It is worth noting that the movement from full-
time employment to part-time employment is particularly small, despite the fact
that, as pointed out by De Callataÿ (2002), the CIBRAP is essentially a “gift”
to part-time workers.
These ﬁgures refer to the reform as a whole. In the appendix, we report
transition matrices for each of the measures contained in the reform. Remark-
ably, the measure that appears to contribute most in encouraging females to
take up a job is the broadening of the ﬁscal brackets, followed by the alignment
of the personal deduction for singles and couples. The refundable tax credit has
only a limited role in promoting increased labour supply.
Net increases in employment and work hours (in absolute ﬁgures) are shown
in ﬁg.22. After the reform female labour supply is estimated to increase by
around 20,000 units. Interestingly, this result is pretty much in line with the
estimates of the Federal Planning Bureau (Saintrain, 2002), although the latter
adopts a completely diﬀerent framework30.C o n ﬁdence intervals were obtained
using the same methodology described above for computing conﬁdence intervals
for elasticities. The size of the conﬁdence interval is very large, probably owing
to the limited size of the estimation sample (as compared to the average sample
size in the studies reviewed above). Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude that
the reform will have a signiﬁcant positive impact on female labour supply and
on hours worked.
It is interesting to compare the estimated impact of the other reforms re-
30In fact the FPB uses an aggregated model in which employment is driven by demand,
and assumes that the decrease in the tax burden will partially beneﬁt the dynamics of labour











(1000 hours/month) 27821.03 28528.83 2.33 [0.07-5.32]
Population in employment 
(1000 units) 908.56 929.74 2.54 [0.28-6.03]
Source: Author's calculations
Figure 22: Net increase in employment and hours worked
viewed in the present paper. Fig. 23 shows the estimates for the German and
the Dutch tax reform, as well as an estimate of the labour supply eﬀect of a FTR
reform for Italy (indeed quite similar to the one currently under examination
by the Italian government). The increase in hours worked is highest in Italy.
It must be noted, however, that Aaberge et al. (2002) estimate labour supply
responses using a “pseudo-continuous” framework: the fact that workers are
not constrained in their choice of hours allows for a marginal increase in hours
worked (the intensive margin) with a simultaneous decrease in the participation
rate (the extensive margin). The second greatest eﬀect in terms of hours comes
from the Dutch reform. This is not surprising as the Dutch labour market is
characterized by signiﬁcant dispersion in work hours and one of the main char-
acteristics of the reform is to increase incentives to work full-time for secondary
earners (Das and Van Soest, 2000). The increase in employment rate (and not
in hours worked) is most relevant in the Belgian reform. Another source of dif-
ference, however, is the fact that the reviewed studies, excluding Bargain (2003),
model both partners’ choices simultaneously (in a unitary setting), while we as-
sumed an unchanged male labour supply strategy. It is likely that some of the
increased participation predicted by our model would disappear if we allowed
for male labour supply to change as well.
Haan and Steiner (2004), however, provide some unexpected ﬁndings in that
respect. Labour supply responses are estimated for both men and women using
both ﬂexible models where both partners are allowed to change working hours
and ﬁxed models where the spouse’s working time is assumed to be ﬁxed. They
ﬁnd that estimated labour supply responses are higher for men when women’s
labour supply is ﬁxed, but the contrary is true for women, whose labour supply
responses are larger when male labour supply is allowed to change. Such em-
pirical ﬁndings should encourage further research to see whether they extend
beyond the German case. Nevertheless, in both models, female labour supply
elasticities are quite low, which explains the limited behavioural reactions.
The results regarding the in-work beneﬁt component of the Belgian tax re-
form should be compared with the French experience only, since the design of
the WFTC is not comparable to the CIBRAP. The results for the WFTC are
38% increase in 
participation
% increase in 
hours worked
Das and Van Soest (2000) Dutch Tax Reform 1.48% 4.01%
Haan and Steiner (2004) German Tax Reform 0.50% 1.03%
Aaberge et Al. (2000) Italian Tax Reform* -1.80% 5.81%
Belgian Tax Reform 2.33% 2.54%
Blundell et al. (2000) WFTC
 - married -0.57% -0.18
 - singles 2.20% 0.75%
Bargain (2004) PPE 0.45% 0.59%
CIBRAP 0.21% 0.30%
*Simulated reform is a 23.3% flat rate tax; continuous LS model
Figure 23: Eﬀects of selected reforms on the labour supply of females in couples
presented here just to stress again the diﬀerence between IWB, and the potential
negative incentives on secondary earners of a means-tested IWB. The French
PPE appears to have a larger impact on female labour supply; almost double.
This is partially due to the diﬀerent design of the measure despite a similar
budgetary eﬀort (in percentage of GDP): the PPE is in fact higher when work-
ing full-time than when working part-time and, more importantly, the beneﬁts
is scaled on the number of dependant children, which is not the case for the
CIBRAP.
If the CIBRAP performs relatively poorly with respect to the PPE, the
global tax reform appears to have quite a substantial impact on female labour
supply. Our analysis of the gains of the reform should therefore be extended to
consider dynamic eﬀects derived from increased labour market participation.
5.1 Distributional impact
Behavioural responses do not signiﬁcantly modify the distributional impact of
the reform as described in the static analysis. Labour supply responses are in
fact distributed over the whole range of the income distribution. Fig. 24 shows
the average percentage gain per income decile. Not surprisingly, in percentage
terms, the gains are more concentrated in the second and in the middle-lower
income deciles. Average incomes are lower at the bottom of the distribution,
so that a dispersed increase in labour supply generates higher percentage gains
than in higher income deciles.
Fig. 25 shows income distribution indicators before and after labour sup-
ply responses. Again the picture is not signiﬁcantly modiﬁed by second-round
eﬀects. Contrary to ﬁrst-round eﬀects, poverty decreases only slightly. Inter-


















Figure 24: Percentage gain before and after LS responses
Before reform
After reform, no 
LS adjustment
After reform, after 
LS adjustment
Poverty
 50% of median disposable income 9.39 8.87 8.81
 60% of median disposable income 15.66 14.98 14.92
Inequality
 Gini 0.2764 0.2772 0.2767
Source: Author's calculations
Figure 25: Income distribution indicators, before reform, after reform and after
LS adjustment
and in the middle range.
Finally, second-round eﬀects will have an eﬀect on the budgetary eﬀorts, as
tax revenue will increase. The increase, however, is rather modest: less than
120 million EUR, i.e. between 4% and 6% of the total cost of the tax reform
(depending on oﬃcial or own estimates).
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Reforms in the tax and beneﬁt system have been implemented by several EU
countries in recent years. This paper evaluates the impact of the Belgian 2001
tax reform, as if the reform had been instantaneously fully implemented. It
therefore neglects the complex rule connected with the progressive implementa-
tion of the reform. The reform is assessed considering both its redistributional
impact (equity) and its eﬀect on potential labour supply (eﬃciency) - although
40the latter evaluation is restricted to females living in couples only.
The static eﬀects of the reform in terms of increase in disposable income
appear to be strongest for the middle to upper class - although all income
deciles beneﬁt to some extent from the tax cuts. In this concern, we may agree
with De Callataÿ (2002) who argues that the 2001 tax bill did not bring about
a true reform of the tax system, but merely a generalized reduction of the ﬁscal
burden that does not alter the existing structure of the tax system. To assess
the potential medium term eﬀects of the reform, we have used a discrete hours
labour supply model, to describe behaviour of women in couples. The dynamic
eﬀects of the labour supply were quite signiﬁcant indeed. The size of the eﬀects
appears to be in the range of the eﬀects related to similar ta xr e d u c t i o ni no t h e r
EU countries. The distribution of incentives appears to be quite dispersed over
the whole range of the income distribution, and particularly low at the bottom
of the distribution. As a consequence, second-round eﬀects modify the ﬁrst
round eﬀects only slightly. To this extent, we also agree with the analysis of
Valenduc (2002) who argues that the potential beneﬁts of the reform are not
concentrated in the range where inactivity traps are most signiﬁcant.
Interestingly, the most celebrated innovation of the reform, i.e. the CIBRAP,
is found to have a small impact as a labour supply incentive. this conclusion,
however, could be altered should the analysis be extended to male labour supply
behaviour and to single-adult households. At the same time, it seems that the
negative impact on full time employment suggested by De Callataÿ (2002) is not
very signiﬁcant, as witnessed by the moderate share of workers shifting from full
time to part time (see annex).
Yet, it is likely that a diﬀerent calibration of tax cuts and in-work beneﬁts
could have concentrated labour supply incentives in the range where inactivity
traps are most signiﬁcant. This issue is left for further research.
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7A p p e n d i x
7.0.1 In-work beneﬁts in North America: The Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) and the Self Suﬃciency Program (SSF)
In the US, the Earned Income Tax Credit was introduced as early as 1975,
wheras the Self-Suﬃciency Programme was introduced in the beginning of the
90s as a massive experimental programme in two Canadian provinces.
Following 1975, the Earned Income Tax Credit was kept at relatively modest
levels for the ﬁrst ten years, and was expanded with the 1986 Tax Reform Act
(TRA-86) of the Reagan administration, and again in 1990. The EITC, however,
gained most importance after the 1993 Tax Act of the Clinton administration,
which brought about an increase of the beneﬁt by over 150%. In order to qualify
for the EITC, a taxpayer must have a positive earned income (deﬁned as earnings
or self-employment income) below a certain amount varying in relation to his
family situation ($29,666 in 2003, for a taxpayer with a qualifying child), at
least a dependent child and must meet some residence criteria . The maximum
amount of the tax credit for 2003 incomes is $4,202 for a taxpayer with two
children with income between $10,500 and $14,750, and it may be claimed as
lump sum or on a monthly basis; the credit for such a unit is phased in at a
rate of 40% and it is phased out at a rate of 21%.
The Self Suﬃciency Program was introduced in Canada on a purely experi-
mental basis in 1992 and data on participants were collected for a period of 10
years up to 2002. Up to now it is probably the biggest research experiment in
social science ever to be set up. In order to have a valid control group, partici-
pation in the programme was randomly oﬀered to 50% of a pre-selected sample
of more than 6,000 lone mothers living in British Columbia or New Brunswick.
Lone mothers needed to be inactive, aged at least 19 and on income assistance
during the past 11 months. Women who were oﬀered participation in the pro-
gramme had a window of 12 months to get into full time employment (at least
30 hours a week). Conditional on participants being in full employment, a sub-
stantial beneﬁt was paid which would reduce the disincentive of the withdrawing
of social assistance once in employment (Card and Robins, 1996). The income
supplement corresponded to half the diﬀerence between a participant’s earnings
from employment and an “earnings benchmark” which varied across provinces
in accordance with the level of IA payments. The benchmark was $37,000 in
British Columbia and $30,000 in New Brunswick. Unearned income (such as
child support) or earnings of other family members did not aﬀect the amount of
the supplement. When tax obligations and tax credits were taken into account,
47most families had incomes from $3,000 to $7,000 per year higher than if they
h a dr e m a i n e do ni n c o m ea s s i s t a n c e .
7.0.2 The microsimulation model: Modété
Modété is a static tax-beneﬁt computer microsimulation model, i.e. a series
of algorithms capable of computing beneﬁt eligibility and tax liability based
on relevant individual and household characteristics. Modété was constructed
at DULBEA — ETE, at the Free University of Brussels (ULB), by Joyeux in
the framework of the EU ﬁnanced project EUROMOD, which aimed at the
development of a European level microsimulation model (Joyeux ,1998). The
model originally used data from the third wave of the PSBH (spring 1994)
and simulated the 1998 tax beneﬁt environment, but has been updated for the
purpose of the present study to simulate 1998 and 2001 tax and beneﬁtr u l e s
on the 1998 wave of the PSBH31.
Technically, Modété operates on an input database — the PSBH — and
through algorithms written in C++ generates an output database where certain
components of household disposable incomes have been simulated. Since some
income transfers depend on the past record of labour market activity, not all
beneﬁts may be simulated. Unemployment compensations and pension incomes
correspond to amounts reported in the interviews. Other allowances, like fam-
ily beneﬁts, MINIMEX and minimum old age pension are exlusively based on
current demographic characteristics, labour market status and income, and are
therefore fully simulated.
As far as liabilities are concerned, all taxes and social security contributions
are fully taken into account by the model, with the only exception of property
tax and deductions for self-employment income (the latter are imputed). Such
limitations, however, do not represent a major drawback for the purpose of the
present study, given that estimations and labour supply forecasts are based on
a sub sample of active and potentially active persons in working age.
Another point of concern is that the PSBH does not report gross incomes:
these have been imputed by reversing the microsimulation model.
7.0.3 The Belgian Tax Reform
Fig. 26 shows all the components of the Belgian Tax Reform and the cor-
responding budgetary eﬀort. Globally, the measures analysed in the present
paper represent around 85% of the total cost of the reform. The remaining
measures may not be easily simulated, given the lack of relevant information in
the dataset.
31See Orsini, 2004a and Orsini 2004b for further details on simulation and validation of the





Reduction in the tax burden on labour
  CIBRAP 0.446 18
  Increase in the deductions for working expenses 0.248 10
  Broadening of the central tax brackets 0.768 31
  Abolition of highest marginal tax rates 0.174 7
Neutrality with respect to marital status
  Alignment of the tax exempt income quotas 1.091 44
  Individualisation of tax reductions for replacement incomes 0.397 16
  Generalisation of separate taxation to unearned income 0.050 2
Improvement in the way that dependent children are taken into account
  Making tax reduction refundable 0.074 3
  Increase in the single parent means-test limit - -
  Generalisation of tax exempt for all single parents with dependent children 0.050 2
More environmentally sound taxation
  Deduction for non-car transport costs 0.074 3
  Energy saving deductions 0.037 1.5
Total 3.334 134.5
Source: Reynders (2001)
Figure 26: Estimated cost of the reform
7.0.4 Hours worked and wage equation
Institutional constraints do not allow for a continuous distribution of working
hours. These are usually ﬁx e db yt h et e r m so fa ne m p l o y m e n tc o n t r a c ta n d
vary only slightly around the typical contract hours. This is especially true
for countries where labour market regulation is particularly tight. Part of the
variation around the full-time and part-time peaks is usually due to measure-
ment error and/or atypical working time in the reference period. Fig. 27 shows
the actual distribution of working hours of females in couples for the estima-
tion sub-sample. The concentration around 0, 20 and 40 hours is particularly
evident.
Fig. 28 reports the distribution of hours after discretization and compares it
with LFS (2001) statistics. The following rule was applied to discretize working
time:
H =0 if (h ≤ 15)
H =2 0 if (30 ≤ h>15)
H =4 0 if (h ≥ 30)
The share of women in atypical part-time is relatively small, so the approx-
imation to part-time is not very signiﬁcant. Female population in part-time
employment is underestimated, whereas full-time employment is slightly overes-
timated in the PSBH. Part of these diﬀerences are probably due to the diﬀerent
year (PSBH data refer to 1998) and sampling design. The inactive population is
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Figure 27: Distribution of hours worked by females in couples
inactive 614248 36.84 363600 27.98
atypical part time 146178 8.77 - -
part-time 438992 26.33 439230 33.80
full-time 468091 28.07 496668 38.22
total 1667509 100.00 1299498 100.00
Source: Author's calculations based on LFS (2001)
LFS (2001) PSBH
Figure 28: Distribution of working hours - females in couples 25-60 years old
due to diﬀerences in total population. We consider only potentially active fe-
males (thus excluding the retired, the unemployed, students and the disabled),
which explains why the two totals diﬀer.
Fig. 29 shows the result for the wage equation. All coeﬃcients are strongly
signiﬁcant and signs and magnitude are as expected: wages increase less than
proportionally with potential experience (deﬁned as age minus 6, minus years
of schooling) and with each additional educational level. In particular females
with master or Ph.D. are paid on average almost twice as much as less educated
women - other things being equal. Estimates of the participation equation
also shows expected results: being married and having children reduces the
probability of being in employment, whereas additional education increases it.
Moreover, the odds of being in employment increase with age, but decrease after
a certain age level. Regional unemployment level decreases the odds of being
in employment. The Wald test for independent equations, nevertheless, was
50Number of obs 2020
Censored obs 673
Uncensored obs 1383
   Wald(6) 369.86
Chi2 0
Coef. Std. Error z P>|z|
Hourly wage
potential experience 0.0275 0.0037 7.50 0.000 0.0203 0.0347
(potential experience)^2 -0.0003 0.0001 -3.48 0.001 -0.0005 -0.0001
educational dummies -  lower secondary 0.1396 0.0682 2.05 0.041 0.0058 0.2733
-  upper secondary 0.3291 0.0687 4.79 0.000 0.1944 0.4639
-  university degree 0.6874 0.0718 9.57 0.000 0.5467 0.8282
-  master or ph. D. 0.8869 0.0777 11.42 0.000 0.7347 1.0392
constant 5.2536 0.0760 69.17 0.000 5.1048 5.4025
Participation
married -0.3220 0.1045 -3.08 0.002 -0.5268 -0.1172
# children under 6 -0.3076 0.0975 -3.16 0.002 -0.4987 -0.1166
age 0.1520 0.0256 5.93 0.000 0.1017 0.2022
(age)^2 -0.0023 0.0003 -7.80 0.000 -0.0029 -0.0017
educational dummies -  upper secondary 0.4591 0.0849 5.41 0.000 0.2927 0.6255
-  university degree 1.0829 0.0994 10.89 0.000 0.8880 1.2778
-  master or ph. D. 1.6235 0.2090 7.77 0.000 1.2139 2.0331
regional unemployment  -0.6932 0.3001 -2.31 0.021 -1.2814 -0.1049
constant -1.6200 0.5491 -2.95 0.003 -2.6962 -0.5438
/athrho 0.1280 0.1150 1.11 0.266 -0.0975 0.3534
/lnsigma -1.0125 0.0352 -28.79 0.000 -1.0814 -0.9436
rho 0.1273 0.11 -0.097 0.3394
sigma 0.3633 0.01 0.339 0.3892
lambda 0.0462 0.04 -0.035 0.1276
Wald test of independent equations (rho=0) 1.24 Chi2 0.266
Author's estimations based on the PSBH
[95% Conf. Interval]
Figure 29: Female wage rate - Heckman two steps estimation
rejected, meaning that the hypothesis of the lack of selection bias could not be
rejected.
Fig. 30 shows the kernel density distributions of predicted and reported
hourly wages for the estimation sub-sample. The distribution of the predicted
wages follows closely that of reported hourly wage, although the former is more
concentrated.
7.0.5 Relative impacte of single measures
Fig. 31 shows the predicted impact of each measure of the tax reform. It shows
that the least eﬀect comes from the lowering of highest marginal tax rates,
whereas the largest eﬀects come from the broadening of the central tax brackets
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Reported hourly wage
Predicted hourly wage
Figure 30: Reported and predicted wage distribution (logarithm of hourly wage)
inactivity part-time full-time pre-reform
inactivity 27.12 0.37 0.54 28.04
part-time 0.01 33.44 0.30 33.75
full-time 0.04 0.04 38.15 38.23
post reform 27.18 33.85 38.99
inactivity part-time full-time pre-reform
inactivity 27.69 0.13 0.01 27.83
part-time 0.01 33.63 0.11 33.75
full-time 0.05 0.04 38.13 38.22
post reform 27.75 33.79 38.25
inactivity part-time full-time pre-reform
inactivity 27.76 0.11 0.17 28.04
part-time 0.01 33.68 0.05 33.75
full-time 0.05 0.05 38.15 38.25
post reform 27.83 33.84 38.37
inactivity part-time full-time
inactivity 27.41 0.28 0.35 28.04
part-time 0.01 33.71 0.03 33.75
full-time 0.04 0.09 38.09 38.22
post reform 27.46 34.08 38.46
Source: Author's calculations
Broadening of central tax brackets
Lowering highest marginal tax rates
CIBRAP
Increasing tax exempt quota for coupples
Figure 31: Labour market eﬀect of single measures of the 2001 tax reform
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